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Abstract—In the current network-based computing world,
where the number of interconnected devices grows exponentially,
their diversity, malfunctions, and cybersecurity threats are in-
creasing at the same rate. To guarantee the correct functioning
and performance of novel environments such as Smart Cities,
Industry 4.0, or crowdsensing, it is crucial to identify the capabil-
ities of their devices (e.g., sensors, actuators) and detect potential
misbehavior that may arise due to cyberattacks, system faults, or
misconfigurations. With this goal in mind, a promising research
field emerged focusing on creating and managing fingerprints
that model the behavior of both the device actions and its
components. The article at hand studies the recent growth of
the device behavior fingerprinting field in terms of application
scenarios, behavioral sources, and processing and evaluation
techniques. First, it performs a comprehensive review of the
device types, behavioral data, and processing and evaluation
techniques used by the most recent and representative research
works dealing with two major scenarios: device identification
and device misbehavior detection. After that, each work is
deeply analyzed and compared, emphasizing its characteristics,
advantages, and limitations. This article also provides researchers
with a review of the most relevant characteristics of existing
datasets as most of the novel processing techniques are based
on machine learning and deep learning. Finally, it studies the
evolution of these two scenarios in recent years, providing lessons
learned, current trends, and future research challenges to guide
new solutions in the area.
Index Terms—Device Behavior Fingerprinting, Device Identifi-
cation, Cyberattack Detection, Behavioral Data, Processing and
Evaluation Techniques, Device Behavior Datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Previsions for 2025 estimate nearly 64 billion IoT devices
connected to each other into diverse cutting-edge environ-
ments such as Smart Cities, Industry 4.0, or crowdsensing
(e.g., Flightradar24, OpenSky, ElectroSense), among others
[1]. These environments have their own particularities in
terms of devices, data, communications, and purposes, which
increase the complexity of achieving one of their common
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challenges: to optimize the performance of devices and provide
accurate services. To meet this challenge, the advancement
of communication networks and computing paradigms has
influenced that behavioral data science evolved from studying
theoretical and empirical issues related to human behaviors
[2] –its initial scope– to conquer the cyberworld and offer a
promising alternative to model device behaviors [3]. Nowadays,
a thriving research field within behavior data science focuses
on creating device behavior patterns (fingerprints) able to
optimize their performance and detect potential issues in the
early stages [4], [5]. In this context, this article studies the
recent growth of the device behavior research field in terms
of application scenarios, behavioral sources, and processing
and evaluation techniques. Fig. 1 shows an overview of the
typical life cycle implemented by the literature, where different
devices, techniques, and application scenarios are considered.
The first step to build a device fingerprint is to identify the
application scenario where it will be needed. By keeping in
mind the goal of optimizing devices and systems performance,
the literature has recognized two critical application scenarios.
The first one consists in identifying devices with different
granularity levels –to differentiate them and fully exploit
their capabilities [6]– while the second focuses on detecting
cyberattacks [7], malfunction [8], or misbehavior [9] –to
mitigate them. The nature of each scenario influences the
selection of behavioral sources, data, and techniques employed
to create fingerprints since the detection of misbehavior
produced by a given cyberattack is different from identifying
several IoT devices of the same family. Even in the same
application scenario, the behavioral data might be different as
well; this is the case of some cyberattacks affecting network
communications [10], while others impact the CPU usage [11].
In both application scenarios, the literature contains an
extensive number of works where device fingerprinting has
been applied [12], [13], [4], [14], [15], [3], [16]. On the one
hand and in terms of device identification, behavioral data
science has dramatically improved the limitations of traditional
solutions, mainly focused on using names, identifiers, labels,
or tags to identify devices [17]. The main limitation of these
approaches is that they can be modified or even duplicated in an
environment where the number of devices grows exponentially.
Another relevant drawback appears when device identification
is performed at different granularity levels, requiring multiple
labels and increasing management complexity. Nowadays, the
literature categorizes the following identification granularity
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Fig. 1: Common life cycle implemented by device behavior fingerprinting solutions.
levels: type, with the main goal of creating fingerprints able
to detect different types of devices [6]; model, focused on
identifying different models of devices based on common
hardware and software [18]; and individual, probably the
most challenging level because it tries to identify identical
physical devices according to minor differences occurred during
manufacturing processes [14].
On the other hand and with the goal of detecting misbehavior
or malfunction caused by cybersecurity issues, novel and
sophisticated cyberattacks are influencing the replacement
of traditional cybersecurity techniques. Existing mechanisms
based on signatures are no longer effective against unseen,
encrypted, or large-scale cyberattacks, and device fingerprinting
has been identified as one of the most promising solutions to
tackle this challenge [19]. A relevant number of works found in
the literature rely on creating “normal” behavioral fingerprints
to spot changes caused by some previous issues [7], [15], [20].
In this case, fingerprint evaluation is usually tackled from an
anomaly detection perspective [7], [21].
In this context, the article at hand performs a comprehensive
analysis of the main characteristics –devices, behavioral sources,
data, and techniques– considered by the most representative
and recent works of device identification and malfunctioning
detection scenarios. Besides, it studies how characteristics
of device identification, and misbehavior and malfunction
detection scenarios are evolving since last years.
Once having the fingerprints, there is another exciting
research area focused on applying the most suitable techniques
to process and evaluate the behavior profiles. Statistical
approaches have been dominating the field for the last decades.
However, the incursion of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and more
concretely machine and deep learning (ML and DL), shifted
the trend and generated an open discussion concerning the most
suitable methods per scenario. This manuscript seeks to help
readers understand the trend concerning behavior processing
and evaluation techniques, as well as the most appropriate
techniques for each application scenario.
Influenced by the rise of AI techniques, there is also a
crescent necessity of exhaustive datasets with which algorithms
can train models able to learn and infer valuable information
aligned with the target scenarios. Datasets are also critical
to have standard benchmarks enabling fair comparisons of
existing techniques and solutions. In this direction, this article
also pretends to support researchers working on the device
behavior research field with a review of the most relevant
characteristics of existing datasets.
Device behavior fingerprinting is an encouraging research
field that has inspired the publication of several survey articles
for the last years. In terms of device identification, in 2016, Xu
et al. [22] reviewed unique device fingerprinting in wireless
networks. Moreover, Baldini and Steri [23] published in 2017
a review on mobile phone identification based on its hardware
components. Regarding the usage of device fingerprint for
cybersecurity purposes, the surveys related to this study are
mainly focused on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). In 2018,
Elrawy et al. [24] published a study focused on IDS and
IoT-based smart environments. Similarly, Khraisat et al. [25],
in 2019, published another review on general IDS-related
solutions and public datasets, mostly containing network data.
In [19], Mishra et al. published a survey, in 2017, where IDS
analysis is addressed with a focus on cloud environments. This
work explicitly considers system behavior analysis, one of the
main sources to ensure a cloud system. Finally, in 2018, Liu
et al. [26] analyzed existing solutions and datasets covering
attack detection based on system calls, with a special focus on
embedded devices.
Despite the contributions of the previous works, as illustrated
in TABLE I, none of them addresses device identification
and misbehavior detection in the same study. Besides, no
previous survey contemplates device behavior fingerprinting
for component malfunctioning detection. Apart from that, the
literature has some additional research questions that need to
be solved. As the main relevant, we highlight:
• Q1. Which scenarios, device types, and sources are present
in behavior-based solutions? Depending on the application
scenario –device identification or malfunction detection–
and the problem to be solved, the devices and behavioral
sources vary. However, in the literature, there is no solution
detailing these elements and how they are combined.
• Q2. What and how behavior processing and evaluation
tasks are used in each scenario? Device behavior can
be processed and evaluated following diverse approaches.
However, the literature has not studied these approaches
from a broad perspective to have a complete view in the
area.
• Q3. What characteristics do the most recent and repre-
sentative solutions of each application scenario have? It
is required to analyze how device types and behavioral
3Work Year DeviceTypes / Area
Device
Identification
Intrusion
Detection
Malfunction
Detection
Dataset
review Focus and solution categorization
[22] 2015 Wirelessdevices 3 7 7 7
• Survey on device fingerprinting in wireless networks.
• Authors differentiate between white list-based and unsupervised algorithms.
[23] 2017 Mobile phones 3 7 7 7
• Survey on mobile device identification based on physical components.
• Fingerprinting techniques are classified in two different categories, emitted
signal-based and electronic component-based.
[19] 2017 Cloudenvironments 7 3 7 7
• Survey on IDSs applications focused on cloud computing environments.
• Intrusion detection techniques are divided into misuse detection (rule-based)
and anomaly detection (behavior-based).
[26] 2018
Any, focus
on embedded
devices
7 3 7 3
• Survey on IDSs deployed in hosts and based on system calls.
• IDSs solutions are divided into anomaly and detection-based and misuse
detection-based.
[24] 2018 IoTEnvironments 7 3 7 7
• Survey on IDSs focused on IoT-based smart environments.
• IDS types are divided into anomaly, specification and misuse-based.
[25] 2019 Any 7 3 7 3
• IDS survey, groups the solutions in signature-based and anomaly-based.
• Data sources divided into network and system logs and audits.
This
work 2020 Any 3 3 3 3
• General survey on device behavior fingerprinting, its application scenarios,
processing techniques and public datasets.
TABLE I: Comparison of survey works considering device behavior fingerprinting.
sources are utilized to solve the problems motivated by
each application scenario. Furthermore, it is also needed to
detect the limitations of solutions related to both scenarios.
• Q4. Which behavior datasets are available and which
are their characteristics? There is no study detailing the
public datasets aligned with device behavior from a broad
perspective, analyzing their characteristics, and defining
in which application scenarios they can be utilized.
• Q5. How have application scenarios evolved for the last
years? To establish the guidelines for future research, it
is critical to describe how device behavior analysis is
evolving in the last years and which are the current trends
and open challenges of the area.
To answer the previous questions and provide readers with
an up-to-date vision of device behavior fingerprinting, the main
contributions of this manuscript are:
• An analysis of the behavior data sources and device types
utilized in the literature, paying attention to the application
scenarios in which each source is contemplated (Q1).
• A description and comparison of the main techniques and
algorithms utilized to model and evaluate device behavior
based on the morphology of the available data (Q2).
• A comprehensive review and comparison of the charac-
teristics, advantages, and limitations of the most relevant
proposals that consider device behavior to 1) identify
device models or types, 2) identify individual devices, 3)
detect cyberattacks, and 4) detect device/system function-
ing faults (Q3).
• A description of the principal public datasets containing
device activity and behavior. This description is divided
into datasets designed for device identification and for
attack or behavior anomaly detection (Q4).
• A set of lessons learned, current trends, and future
challenges drawn from the device behavior works and
datasets reviewed (Q5).
Fig. 2 shows where and how the previous questions and
contributions are addressed by the article at hand. Furthermore,
the remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section
II gives an analysis of device types, application scenarios, and
behavior sources. Section III reviews the main approaches
and algorithms utilized to process behavioral data. Section IV
describes and compares the main solutions found in the state-of-
the-art. Section V examines the main public datasets containing
device activities. Section VI draws a set of lessons learned,
current trends, and future challenges in the research area.
Finally, Section VII provides an insight into the conclusions
extracted from the present work.
II. BEHAVIOR CHARACTERIZATION ANALYSIS
With the goal of answering Q1 (Which scenarios, device
types, and sources are present in behavior-based solutions?),
this section studies the most used and promising scenarios
where device behavior has been considered: device identifica-
tion and misbehavior detection. After that, and aligned with
these scenarios, it analyzes the main device types from which
behavioral data is obtained, and the most common behavior
dimensions and characteristics considered by device fingerprint
solutions existing in the literature.
A. Application Scenario
According to the heterogeneous capabilities of device
behavior fingerprinting, the literature has applied it in a wide
variety of scenarios with different objectives. After reviewing
the state-of-the-art, we highlight the following two categories
as the most used and well-known: Device identification and
Misbehavior detection.
Device identification uses the behavior of devices to identify
them and their characteristics. This task can be performed from
the following two perspectives.
• Device type or model identification. Device type identi-
fication [6], [12] aims to recognize the device category
such as general computer, IoT sensor, or embedded device,
among others. In contrast, device model identification [18],
[27] aims to differentiate between devices of the same
type but different hardware and software configurations.
• Individual device identification [14], [28] distinguishes
between devices with identical hardware and software
capabilities. This approach requires the lower level data,
usually related to hardware variations during fabrication.
Although device activity can also be employed to model
user behavior and perform user’s identification and authen-
tication [29], [30], [31], user inputs and activity monitoring
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Fig. 2: Discussed questions per article section.
fall out of the scope of this study, which is focused only
on device behavior analysis, without human interaction.
Misbehavior detection seeks to identify anomalous situ-
ations based on changes in normal device behaviors. The
anomalous situations are very varied; therefore, the solutions
trying to recognize these situations are also heterogeneous. The
next two main families of behavior anomaly detection solutions
can be found in the literature.
• Attack detection [7], [32], [20], [33] intends to detect
anomalies, created by cyber threats, according to the
previously known normal device behavior. These solutions
are commonly deployed as an IDS based on device
behavior, being either Network-based (NIDS) or Host-
based (HIDS). The cyberattacks detected using behavior
are very diverse and depend on the monitored dimensions.
These can range from impersonation and spoofing to
malware execution.
• Malfunction and fault detection [8], [34], [16] tries to
identify devices that are not functioning correctly because
some component or service is failing. The malfunctioning
could be caused by faults such as damaged hardware, a
service or hardware overload, or network issues. Solutions
addressing this approach assume that the fault will
somehow affect the general device behavior.
B. Device Type
Device activities, properties, and interactions can be mon-
itored in an exhaustive range of heterogeneous devices and
systems. Then, behavioral patterns can be built with diverse
goals by almost any device. However, the data collection
process is different depending on factors such as device
hardware and software. At this point, it is important to describe
the principal device and system categories used in the previous
application scenarios.
• Personal computers. This category includes computers
commonly found in homes and workplaces [35]. We
can differentiate two main kinds of personal computers,
desktop devices and laptops, differentiated by power
supply.
• Mobile devices. Smartphones and tablets are grouped in
this category. Mobile devices are mainly constrained by
battery.
• Embedded systems. These low-cost systems are designed
and built to perform very specific tasks and their func-
tionality is usually limited due to processing and energy
constraints [36].
• Industrial Control Systems (ICS). This family groups
devices and systems that supervise and control critical
services of industrial processes [37], involving sensors
and actuators. ICSs are usually deployed as supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [38].
• IoT devices. Any system with processing power and
connected to the Internet can be considered as an IoT
device. Typically, the IoT device concept is associated
with embedded systems with connectivity capabilities such
as sensors and smart-home objects, among others [36].
• Cloud systems. They provide the following three principal
service models, in which resources can be accessed
remotely and through network [39]: Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software
as a Service (SaaS). In the last years, Cloud paradigm
has evolved towards Fog [40] and Edge Computing [41],
where cloud systems are deployed closer to end-user
devices, reducing latency and speeding up computations.
• SDN/NFV systems. SDN and NFV are concepts that
usually appear together, although they can also be utilized
separately [42]. The Software Defined Networking (SDN)
paradigm [43] is a network architecture where network
control is decoupled from the data plane, having a
centralized controller managing the traffic flows and en-
abling network programmability and abstraction. Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) paradigm [44] is a network
architecture where network devices are vitalized using
software implementations.
• Containers and microservices. Containers are software
packages that include an application code and all its
dependencies, allowing a lightweight deployment. Mi-
croservices [45] are applications with a single fixed
function, commonly deployed as containers. Several
microservices can be combined to build more complex
applications distributedly.
• Clusters. A cluster is a set of computers, typically Linux
devices [46], connected closely to combine their resources
and work as a single system. Then, the cluster behavior
will be defined by the behavior of its components.
5C. Behavior Source
Once the most representative application scenarios and
devices have been explained, it is necessary to describe the
behavior sources found in the literature, their pros and cons,
and the solutions using each source. This description has been
structured by following the next two main categories considered
in the literature: externally-collected behavior sources and in-
device behavior sources. Finally, the key aspects of the behavior
data considered by each solution are compared.
1) Externally-collected behavior sources: In this category,
an external device is used to monitor the device behavior.
Concretely, network communications and emitted electromag-
netic signals are the main externally-collected sources used
to model devices behavior. In the case of network-based data,
data is usually collected by a proxy or a gateway, while
electromagnetic signal-based data is collected by a sensor
through an antenna.
Network communications. From the network communi-
cations perspective, a diverse set of behavioral features can
be extracted by monitoring network packets. They depend
on the granularity of the traffic inspection and the TCP/IP
layers gathered. The main advantage of this dimension is its
universality, as almost any device has network interfaces, and
the possibility of monitoring many devices from a single gate-
way. As drawbacks, this dimension can suffer impersonation
attacks and encryption makes data analysis more difficult. In
this context, some solutions only focus on the amount of data
sent/received and the IPs to which the device is connected
[9], [47]. Other solutions also perform packet header and flow
statistics analysis [12], [48]. And finally, other solutions also
include data related to transport or application layer protocols
or payload data [49], [50]. From the application usage point of
view, this category is utilized for device model identification
[4], [48], device type identification [13], [6], attack detection
[51], [15], [7] and fault detection [52].
Clock Skew. Based on crystal oscillator imperfections that
occurred during the manufacturing process, internal clock
counters of different devices have slight variations. In this
sense, it is possible to utilize this characteristic to differentiate
devices based on their hardware behavior. The main advantage
of this source is that it can be collected from outside the device.
As drawback, clock skew distribution concentrates around 0, so
this source cannot be applied as a unique source in large device
deployments [53]. Clock skew can be calculated by observing
how internal device timestamps vary in time, mainly using TCP
and ICMP timestamps [54] and Wi-Fi beacon timestamps [55],
[56], so it can be seen as a special category of network-based
data. From the application perspective, clock skew has been
utilized for individual device identification [55], [56], [57],
[58].
Electromagnetic signals. This category relies on the be-
havior of electromagnetic signals emitted by each device. Its
main advantage is the difficulty of tampering it, as it depends
on emitted signal properties. In terms of disadvantages, we
highlight that the data gathering process must be physically
close to the monitored device, since electromagnetic signals
lose intensity as the distance to the transmitter increases. Radio
signals are used in the literature to distinguish among physical
devices [14], [59]. However, although radio signals have been
utilized to detect anomalies in the radio spectrum [60], no
solution specifically focused on device behavior anomaly
detection using radio signals has been found. Following a
similar approach, other solutions utilize the electromagnetic
signals radiated from the device components to identify physical
devices [61].
TABLE II compares the main characteristics of externally-
collected data. As observed, features related to network
communications are used both for device identification and
misbehavior detection, as this source is very heterogeneous. In
contrast, clock skew and electromagnetic-based features are
only applied in device identification, as they are lower-level
sources related to device component characteristics.
Feature BehaviorSource Device Type
Application Scenario
DI MD
Packet headers
statistics
Network
Communications
Computers, IoT
devices, ICS
[13] [12]
[18] [27]
[62]
[5] [15]
[51] [63]
[9] [64]
Network flows
statistics
Network
Communications
Computers, IoT
devices, ICS
[65] [6]
[4] [66]
[67]
[7] [10]
[32] [68]
[69] [52]
[70] [71]
[72] [73]
[74]
Packet
payload data
and statistics
Network
Communications
Computers, IoT
devices, SDN, ICS
[50] [48]
[49]
[75] [76]
[77]
Clock drift
in time Clock Skew
Computers, mobile
and IoT devices, ICSs
[55][56]
[57][58] 7
Raw IQ
samples
values
Electromagnetic
signals
Computers, mobile
and IoT devices, ICSs [14] [59] 7
Signal
frequency
Electromagnetic
signals
Computers, mobile
and IoT devices, ICSs [61] 7
TABLE II: Externally-collected behavior characteristics. (DI:
Device Identification. MD: Misbehavior Detection.)
2) In-device behavior sources: In this category, behavioral
data monitoring is performed on the target devices. Thus, lower-
level data related to the device internal functioning can be
collected. This approach has the advantage of not requiring a
connection to an external monitoring device. In contrast, as a
drawback, if the device suffers an anomaly, such as an attack,
the monitoring solution may suffer it as well.
Hardware Events. Hardware Performance Counters (HPC)
are special registers built into modern microprocessors that
store hardware-related event counters. The main advantage of
this category is the precision achieved to model the device
operation from a low-level perspective. In contrast, the quantity
and morphology of the HPCs depend on the device CPU
model, which makes it difficult to build general solutions. In
the literature, some solutions [78], [79], [80] utilize HPCs to
model software behavior and detect abnormal operations. In
addition, [79] also utilizes HPCs to identify and authenticate
different devices.
System processors and oscillators. Some devices have
hardware components that include a crystal oscillator. As
in clock skew, the manufacturing imperfections of these
components can be utilized to differentiate physical devices
by comparing their counters drift in time. The main advantage
of this source is its low-level, which enables to differentiate
6devices with the same software and hardware. However, the
device should include hardware using oscillators, something un-
usual in resource-constrained devices. Moreover, manufacturing
errors are usually small [53]. In the literature, two components
used for this purpose are the Real Time Clock (RTC) and the
Digital Signal Processor (DSP) [81]. In addition, the time it
takes the CPU to execute a particular code or function can also
be used to model system behavior. In this case, this data has
been used to identify device models and the devices themselves
[82].
Resource Usage. In this category, different device compo-
nents usage and status are monitored. Commonly, the monitored
components are CPU, memory, disk, and network. Various pa-
rameters can be extracted from each component, such as usage
percentage or input/output statistics. In terms of advantages,
this source is quite general and can be monitored in many
devices and systems. As drawback, continuous resource usage
monitoring consumes many resources. In the literature, this data
is utilized to identify devices [28] and detect behavior anomalies
caused by cyberattacks [21] or system malfunctioning [83],
[34], [47].
Software and Processes. The software deployed in a device
or system also has its particular behavior. Then, the conjunction
of the isolated software behaviors can be utilized to model a
global device behavior fingerprint. As advantage, software
monitoring can accurately model normal device behavior.
However, this source is affected by system updates and
legitimate software modifications. Software can be modeled in
several ways:
• System calls and logs. They serve to monitor the
interactions between the programs running on a device
and its operating system. These interactions encompass
process, file, and communication management operations.
From the application usage point of view, system call
sequences and logs have been used to characterize device
behavior and detect anomalies [33], [84], [85], [86], [87],
[88].
• Process properties. Device software behavior can be
modeled by monitoring each process properties, such as
name, status, or threads. This category also includes the
resources utilized to execute a particular program or code.
In the literature, this category is commonly monitored
together with resource usage or system calls to detect
anomalous behaviors [89].
• Software signatures. Software snapshots (signatures) are
generated for the different device executable and their
configuration files using hashing algorithms. Then, the
snapshots are used to detect software modifications that
cause behavior anomalies [16], [90].
Device Sensors and Actuators. The data collected in this
dimension is very diverse and depends on the device and
scenario typology. The main advantage of this source is that it
can also detect environment failures or attacks. As drawback,
environment knowledge is required to analyze and understand
the data from this dimension, as each device may have different
sensors and actuators. From the application usage point of
view, sensor and actuator measurements are utilized to detect
anomalies [20], [8], [91], [92] and model device types [4], while
sensor hardware information is used to physically identify the
devices [93].
To conclude, on the one hand, TABLE III compares the main
characteristics of data directly collected from the modeled
device. It can be appreciated how HPCs, CPU percentage,
system calls, software signatures, and sensor values are
used both for device identification and misbehavior detection.
Besides, low-level information related to the system processors
and sensor hardware is only employed for device identification.
Finally, features related to resource usage and process properties
are only employed in misbehavior detection. On the other
hand, Fig. 3 shows the behavior sources considered by each
device type, and in which application scenario these sources are
utilized. The numbers indicate the total number of connections
each element has. It can be appreciated that the most extended
sources, based on their generality, are network communications,
hardware events, resource usage, and software and processes.
Feature BehaviorSource Device Type
Application Scenario
DI MD
HPC Hardware Events Embedded systems,IoT devices [79]
[78] [79]
[80]
RTC drift System processorsand oscillators Computers [81] 7
DSP
performance
System processors
and oscillators Computers [81] 7
Code
execution time
System processors
and oscillators Computers [82] 7
CPU usage
percentage Resource Usage
Computers,
embedded devices,
microservices,
cloud, NFV, and
cluster systems
[28]
[21] [34]
[94] [11]
[83] [47]
[95] [96]
[16] [97]
CPU activity Resource Usage
Microservices,
NFV, cloud, and
cluster systems
7
[34] [94]
[83] [96]
[3]
System
storage usage Resource Usage
Microservices,
NFV, cloud, and
cluster systems
7
[34] [94]
[83] [95]
System
memory usage Resource Usage
Microservices,
NFV, cloud, and
cluster systems
7
[34] [94]
[83] [47]
[95] [96]
[16] [97]
[3]
I/O throughput
per network
interface
Resource Usage
Microservices,
NFV, cloud, and
cluster systems
7
[21] [34]
[83] [47]
[95] [96]
[97]
System calls
and logs
Software and
Processes
Computers,
resource-
constrained
devices, cloud
and NFV systems
[33]
[33][84]
[85] [88]
[86][87]
Process
properties
Software and
Processes Computers 7
[89] [98]
[3]
Software
signatures
Software and
Processes IoT devices [90] [16] [90]
Sensor
measurements
values
Device Sensors
and Actuators ICS [4]
[20][8]
[91][92]
Sensor
hardware
properties
Device Sensors
and Actuators ICS [93] 7
TABLE III: In-device behavior characteristics. (DI: Device
Identification. MD: Misbehavior Detection.)
III. BEHAVIOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION
TECHNIQUES
Once reviewed the behavioral data monitored per type of
device and application scenario, the data needs to be processed
7Personal computers
Mobile devices
Cloud systems
ICSs
SDN/NFV 
systems
Clusters
IoT 
Devices
Embedded 
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Fig. 3: Behavior sources available in each device type and
application scenarios. (The numbers shown for each item
indicate its total number of connections.)
to create a fingerprint. This section deals with Q2 (What and
how behavior processing and evaluation tasks are used in each
scenario?) by detailing the algorithms and techniques com-
monly used in the literature to create and evaluate fingerprinting
profiles, highlighting their main advantages and drawbacks. The
existing techniques are categorized in the following five groups:
rule-based, statistical, knowledge-based, Machine Learning
and Deep Learning, and time series approaches. The previous
categories are not mutually exclusive and a particular solution
can belong to several categories. Furthermore, the behavior
processing can be centralized, in the own device or a server,
or distributed using technologies such as blockchain [99],
distributed [100] or federated learning [101], among others.
A. Rule-based
This is the most straightforward approach to create behavioral
profiles. It is useful for devices with a well-known behavior and
a reduced set of actions. In this approach, a set of rules defines
how the system should behave, that is, its behavioral fingerprint.
Rules can be defined statically, based on pre-defined actions, or
dynamically, based on the historical actions performed by the
device. Any deviation from these rules is considered a fault or
anomaly. The main advantages of this approach are its speed
and simplicity. As drawbacks, it requires previous knowledge
about the device behavior, and it is not suitable for changing
and complex scenarios. Rule-based evaluation is utilized for
device type or model definition and anomaly detection.
For device behavior evaluation, a recent approach is the
usage of Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUD) standard
[102] files, which define the normal device functioning and are
commonly issued by vendors. This method is mainly utilized
for IoT behavior fingerprint generation and evaluation [71],
[10]. Another rule-based approach is to explicitly define the
software that the device can execute [90] or thresholds for
resource usage [103].
B. Statistical
In this approach, relatively basic statistical data processing
techniques are utilized to extract inferences (properties) from
data samples. This approach is usually considered in data pre-
processing and anomaly detection. The main advantage of this
approach is its simplicity and that these algorithms do not
require large datasets. However, it does not handle well multi-
dimensional data, and consistent evaluation decisions require
previous knowledge in the area.
For pre-processing, it is common to infer features using sta-
tistical functions such as average, standard deviation, quartiles,
maximum, or minimum, among others. Regarding evaluation,
in some solutions [21], the interquartile range (IQR) is used
as a statistical measure representing the presence of outliers
and anomalies based on data variability (dispersion). In the
same line, Euclidean Distance is used by some approaches
[52], [9] to determine anomaly values based on the distance
between two data measurements. Finally, some works [55],
[8] utilize Expectation Maximization algorithm for clustering
and parameter estimation based on statistically-inferred latent
variables.
C. Knowledge-based
This approach aims to represent knowledge extracted from
received data and build a reasoning system capable of inferring
new knowledge. Commonly, the knowledge is built based on a
set of ontologies, and the decision-making process is based on
if-then derivation rules. The main advantages of this approach
are the explainability of the inferred solutions and that it can
solve problems involving incomplete data. As drawbacks, this
approach takes longer time, and it has reduced scalability, as
the system could become too complex if large amounts of data
are utilized.
Knowledge-based approaches are utilized mainly for be-
havioral anomaly detection, being the main ones look-ahead
algorithms and finite state machines. Look-ahead algorithms
are commonly combined or used to make decisions in more
complicated approaches, such as state machines. Furthermore,
these algorithms are also directly used to detect anomalies
[33]. Finite state machines, such as Markov Models [104] and
n-gram models [105], describe the sequential logic followed
8by a certain entity and predict its future status based on the
previous ones. In the literature, they are widely applied for
behavior anomaly detection [33], [16], [10], [80], [86].
D. Machine Learning and Deep Learning
In recent years, and based on the increase of processing
power and available data, Machine Learning (ML) [106] and
Deep Learning (DL) [107] algorithms have gained enormous
relevance in almost every industrial or research area. The main
advantages of ML/DL based approaches are their capacity
to detect complex data patterns, handle multi-dimensional
and multi-variate data, and adapt themselves to dynamic and
heterogeneous scenarios using massive data. As disadvantages,
the model decisions are usually hardly explainable, based on
the black-box nature of the generated models. Besides, these
algorithms, especially in DL, require large amounts of data
to be trained, and the algorithm training can take much time
and resources. Also, most algorithms require parameter tuning,
which implies repeating the training process several times.
Since ML and DL techniques are very diverse, they have been
widely used for device behavior fingerprint generation and
evaluation, both for device identification [4], [48], [13], [50],
[67], [65], [14], [59], [61] and misbehavior detection [51], [15],
[5], [63], [68], [69], [77], [87].
According to the morphology of the data they receive and
the type of predictions they make, ML/DL algorithms applied
in behavior analysis are distinguished into two main categories:
Supervised Learning and Unsupervised Learning.
The goal of Supervised learning is to infer a model capable
of predicting the output of data vectors based on training
labeled data [106]. Supervised algorithms are mainly divided
into classification and regression techniques.
• Classification algorithms try, based on the training data,
to predict the class to which unseen data vectors be-
long. Additionally, anomaly detection can be performed
using classification algorithms by labeling the data as
normal/anomaly. Common ML classification algorithms
are Decision Tree (DT) [108], Random Forest (RF) [109],
Logistic Regression (LR) [110], Naive Bayes (NB) [111]
or Support Vector Machine (SVM) [112]. These algorithms
are widely utilized for behavior evaluation in device
identification [13], [6], [12], [4], [50], [66], [48], [27],
[62], [49], [61] and behavioral anomaly recognition [85],
[97], [68], [69], [63], [77], [70], [64], [74].
• Regarding Regression algorithms, the output is a con-
tinuous number and not a class, like in classification
techniques. Usual ML regression algorithms are Linear
and Polynomial Regression [113], which are applied in
behavior analysis to evaluate device behavior and its
fluctuation [63].
In Unsupervised learning [106], data vectors are not labeled,
so feature vectors only contain input data. This kind of
algorithm is used to extract patterns by modeling probability
densities on the given data. The three main applications of
Unsupervised learning are dimensionality reduction, clustering,
and anomaly detection.
• Dimensionality Reduction algorithms aim to reduce the
number of variables or features under consideration by
obtaining a set of principal variables from the input
data. In behavior-based solutions, Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [114] and t-Distributed Stochastic Neigh-
bor Embedding (t-SNE) [115] are utilized to speed up
computations and derive new features [5], [66], [10].
Moreover, dimensionality reduction is combined with
statistical algorithms for anomaly evaluation [34], [52],
[94], [96].
• Clustering algorithms have the objective of grouping the
input vectors into a different set of objects based on their
similarities. In device behavior fingerprinting, k-means
[116] and Density-based spatial clustering of applications
with noise (DBSCAN) [117] are usually applied to infer
device classes or types [6], [49], [95], [3].
• Anomaly Detection algorithms seek to identify rare items,
events, or observations based on a set of unlabeled data
points and the assumption that most of the training data is
normal. From this approach, One-Class SVM (OC-SVM)
[118] and Isolation Forest (IF) [119] are widely used in
the literature [7], [32], [120].
From a DL perspective, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
[107] are frequently used in the above approaches. However,
a type of architecture cannot be related to a specific use
due to neural networks flexibility, as layers, neurons, and
their connections can be organized in many ways depending
on the problem to be solved. The main types of networks
applied in behavior processing are: Multi-Layer Perceptrons
(MLP), utilized for device identification [27], [67] and anomaly
type classification [70]; Autoencoders, applied for behavior
anomaly detection [18] and dimensionality reduction purposes;
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), such as Long Short-Term
Memory networks (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Unit networks
(GRU), applied from a time series perspective for device
identification [18], [14] and behavior anomaly recognition [15],
[72], [87], [92], [20]; and Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN), utilized for physical device identification based on
signal processing from a time series approach [14], [59].
The previous network topologies can be combined to perform
more complex tasks. For example, some solutions [18] utilize
LSTM layers to build an autoencoder, while other approaches
[73] combine different neural networks to build Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) [121].
E. Time Series
Time series analysis utilizes data measurements as a sequence
of values where each measurement is related to the previous
and the next ones. It includes a wide variety of algorithms
and models, including the ones based on ML/DL or statis-
tical algorithms. This approach is utilized both for device
identification and anomaly detection, directly in the model
generation or as data pre-processing. The main advantages of
this approach are its improved performance over single-value
processing approaches. However, it requires a large amount
of data to detect the temporal patterns, and the processing is
time-consuming.
9Approach Simplicity
Expert
knowledge
required
Fast
computation /
Low resource
Large
datasets
required
Large
training time
Multi-
dimensional
data
Decision
explainability Adaptability
Complex
feature
correlations
Rule-based 3 3 3 7 7 7 3 Dynamicapproaches 7
Statistical 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7
Knowledge-based Partial 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 Partial
ML/DL-based 7 7 7 Mainly DL Mainly DL 3 Partial 3 3
Time series 7 7 7 3 3 ML/DL-based 7 ML/DL-based ML/DL-based
TABLE IV: Behavioral processing approaches comparison.
Time series analysis methods are divided into two different
types, frequency-based methods, which analyze data as a
signal with a certain frequency, and time-based methods, which
analyze data evolution with respect to time.
In terms of frequency-based methods, Fourier Transform
(FT) [122], and derived functions, are applied as pre-processing
to obtain the frequencies that form the value signal [79], [6].
From time-based methods, AutoRegressive Moving Average
(ARMA) and derived algorithms are used in behavior prediction
applications [47], [9]. In addition, Dynamic Time Warping
algorithm is also utilized in device behavior evaluation [28],
directly comparing the values of two time series.
Besides, as stated before, Deep Learning has been applied
in behavioral data evaluation from a time series perspective
utilizing RNNs [18], [15], [72], [87], [92], [20] and CNNs
[14], [59].
TABLE IV compares the main properties of the five behavior
processing approaches identified in the literature analysis.
As general conclusion, when the behavior of the device
is composed of a limited and known number of actions
and there is not a large number of dimensions in the data,
the appropriate approaches would be those based on rules
and statistical algorithms, given their reduced complexity
and resource consumption. However, when the data features
maintain complex relationships between them, the most suitable
solutions are those based on knowledge and ML/DL approaches.
Finally, when there is a relationship between the different
measurements based on their order, a time series approach
may provide improved results. Depending on the amount of
data, the available resources, and the complexity of the feature
correlations, some particular algorithms are better than others.
For example, a simple IoT device, like a bulb, with a limited
and known set of actions, can be modeled with a rule-based
approach, leveraging its limited resources. In contrast, a cloud
service that executes different tasks would be hard to model
using rules, instead, an ML/DL-based approach exploiting the
correlations in the sources available would be more successful.
Overall, Fig. 4 shows the global and per year distribution of
works using each technique, note that some works may utilize
techniques belonging to more than one category.
Additionally, to properly evaluate and compare the solutions
performance, it is critical to define relevant metrics. Then,
independently of the evaluation approach followed, there is a
set of common metrics utilized in the majority of behavior-
based solutions. TABLE V shows these common metrics. In
the case of classification approaches, these metrics are based
on the values present on a confusion matrix, while in the case
of regression approaches, the metrics are based on prediction
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Fig. 4: Yearly and global distribution of processing techniques
used by device behavior fingerprinting solutions.
errors [123], [11]. Moreover, some solutions also consider
factors such as detection time or resource usage.
IV. BEHAVIOR-BASED SOLUTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
This section performs an in-depth review of the most relevant
works of the literature that deal with behavioral fingerprinting
to answer Q3 (What characteristics do the most recent and
representative solutions of each application scenario have?).
The analysis of each solution considers the application scenario,
device type, behavior source, data monitored, processing and
evaluation algorithms, and results criteria. Below, the approach
followed by each solution is detailed and grouped by application
scenario and behavior source.
A. Device Type or Model Identification
In this application scenario, we review solutions whose
objective is to identify device models or types. Devices
belonging to the same model or type are treated as equals
by the literature and their main characteristics are compared
in TABLE VI.
The existing works in the area of device type or model
behavior fingerprinting address the identification problem from
a network analysis perspective. Furthermore, they are mainly
focused on IoT and ICS devices differentiation, as this section
shows. In this context, the authors of [62], proposed two
different fingerprinting methods for ICS devices. The first was
based on the response time between a TCP acknowledgment
and the application layer response, once the data had been
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Metric name Description Equation
Accuracy Total number of correctpredictions over the total made
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
Precision Ratio of actual positives over allthe elements predicted as positives
TP
TP + FP
Recall,
Sensitivity or
True Positive
Rate (TPR)
Proportion of actual
positives correctly identified
TP
TP + FN
Specificity or
True Negative
Rate (TNR)
Proportion of actual
negatives correctly identified
TN
FP + TN
False Positive
Rate (FPR)
or False
Acceptance
Rate (FAR)
Proportion of the elements
wrongly determined as positive
among the actual negatives
FP
FP + TN
False Negative
Rate (FNR)
or False
Rejection
Rate (FRR)
Proportion of the elements
wrongly determined as negatives
among the actual positives
FN
TP + FN
F1-Score
It is the harmonic mean of
precision and recall. Also
known as F-Score or F-measure
2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
Equal Error
Rate (EER)
Threshold that equals
the FAR and FRR. FAR = FRR
Area Under
Curve (AUC)
Area covered by the plot of TPR
and FPR (ROC Curve) at different
threshold values between 0 and 1
∫
ROC
Mean Squared
Error (MSE)
Average of the squares of
the prediction errors. It
is utilized in regression
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xi)2
Root Mean
Squared Error
(RMSE)
Root of the average of the
squares of the prediction errors.
It is utilized in regression
√
(
∑n
i=1(yi − xi)2
n
)
Mean
Absolute
Error (MAE)
Absolute average of the prediction
errors. It is utilized in regression
1
n
n∑
i=1
|yi − xi|
Root Relative
Squared
Error (RRSE)
Error relative to a simple
predictor that always returns
the average of the actual values
√
(
∑n
i=1(yi − xi)2∑n
i=1(xi −X)2
),
X =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
Detection or
modeling time
Period elapsed between an
attack or anomaly starts and the
monitoring system detects it, or the
time elapsed to model the device
behavior accurately [12], [15]
−
Processing
overhead
or resource
consumption
Resource usage of behavior
monitoring and processing, which
is particularly relevant in resource-
constrained devices [78], [80], [83]
−
TP: True Positive, TN: True Negative, FP: False Positive, FN: False Negative.
TABLE V: Common evaluation metrics considered by device
behavior fingerprinting solutions.
processed. The second method used the physical operation
times to develop a unique signature for each device model by
measuring the time elapsed to apply some actions in an actuator.
The fingerprint classification accuracy reached by both methods
was 99% (using an ANN) and 92% (using NB), respectively.
In [12], Miettinen et al. proposed IoT Sentinel, an IoT device
type identification approach based on device setup network
communications. The main goal of this work was to identify
device types connected to the network in order to recognize
potentially vulnerable ones and enhance their security based
on rules. Packet headers were analyzed to derive 23 features,
which were used as input for Random Forest classification.
The average device identification accuracy was 81.5% in 27
tested devices, being over 95% in 17 devices. The device
classification process took 157.7 ms on average. Bezawada et
al. [50] also presented a network-based methodology to perform
device behavioral fingerprinting and device type identification
inspired by previous works in SIP-based device fingerprinting
[124], [125]. A behavior model data was divided into static,
based on the set of protocols used by the IoT device, and
dynamic, based on the packet flow sequences. Different features
were derived from the previous data, some of them relative to
headers (network/transport/application protocols, IP options),
and others focused on the packet payload (entropy, TCP payload
length, and TCP window size). Gradient boosting was applied
to a dataset generated by the authors to classify different
device models. The authors reported 86-99% identification rate
(TPR) and 99% accuracy. By following the same direction,
Shahid et al. [66] identified different IoT device types using
bidirectional flow characteristics. Four different device types
were utilized: sensor, camera, bulb, and plug. t-SNE was
used for dimensionality reduction, and typical ML and DL
classification algorithms were utilized for evaluation. This
solution achieved 99.9% accuracy using Random Forest.
Also dealing with device type or model identification, the
authors of [13], utilized ping operations to generate a fingerprint
of different IoT devices to distinguish real embedded machines
from virtual and emulated embedded systems. Several devices
were grouped in each category to make them diverse enough for
the classifiers to recognize previously unseen devices. For each
ping, timing information was collected, such as ping response
time and system timestamp. Then, 14 statistical features
(e.g., average, max, min, variance, mode, or median) were
calculated using ping requests separated in time by 0.2 seconds.
Finally, a classification approach was performed using typical
ML algorithms. Random Forest, combined with Extremely
Randomized Trees for feature selection, achieved a detection
rate of 99.5% using only 25 pings (5 seconds) and 99.9%
using 200 (40 s). Oser et al. [27] utilized TCP timestamps to
measure the clock skew of different IoT device models and
identify them. In IoT devices, the authors commented that
crystal imperfections produce a drift of about 8.64 seconds
per day, which could be enough to identify different physical
crystals. 562 devices of 51 different models were utilized
for classification-based testing. Using only clock skew as the
unique feature for device classification, the algorithm could not
identify most of the devices. Then, the authors decided to utilize
12 additional features derived from the timestamps gathered
to calculate the clock skew. Using these derived features,
Random Forest achieved 97.03% precision, 94.64% recall, and
99.76% accuracy when classifying device models. Thangavelu
et al. [49] proposed DEFT, a distributed device fingerprint
and identification system. The system was designed for SDN
applications, but it could be used in other environments. In
this approach, network gateways performed device monitoring
and classification locally, while a centralized control entity
generated and distributed the classifiers. The gateways and the
controller were synchronized to identify new device types and
share data. Network features were extracted based on packet
headers, DNS queries, and HTTP URIs. Selected features were
related to statistical information about common IoT application
layer protocols (HTTP/S, SSDP, QUIC, MQTT, STUN, NTP,
and BOOTP) and grouped in 15-minutes sessions. To identify
new device types, clustering algorithms (k-means) were applied.
In the classification experiments of known devices, Random
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Forest achieved 98% accuracy. When recognizing unknown
devices, accuracy was 97%, having +97% F1-Score in 14 of
the 16 tested devices.
Another relevant work in the scenario of IoT device model
identification was proposed by Marchal et al. [6]. The authors
presented AuDI (Autonomous IoT Device-Type Identification),
a system designed to identify IoT device type by passively
analyzing its periodic network communications. The system did
not use pre-defined labels, instead, network data was grouped
using clustering algorithms. To recognize periodic flows,
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) was applied to candidate
periods, transforming time domain to frequency domain. Then,
33 different features, grouped in 4 different categories (periodic
flows, period accuracy, period duration, and period stability),
were calculated for each period. Finally, k-NN was used to
classify the cluster-labeled data, achieving >90% F1-Score for
21 of the 23 labels, and 98.2% overall accuracy. The authors
claimed that the collected dataset will be published in the future.
Similarly, Arunan Sivanathan et al. [4], [123] worked on device
type classification. In this case, the network data was captured
using tcpdump, and packets and flows were used to extract
behavior features. These features were utilized to perform
device classification, achieving an average accuracy of 99.88%
and RRSE of 5.06%, and behavioral monitoring tasks, achieving
97.5%, 97.3%, 97.4% average weighted precision, recall,
and F1-Score, respectively. In the same direction, OConnor
et al. [48] proposed HomeSnitch, a framework designed
to classify home IoT devices communication by semantic
behavior (e.g., firmware update/check, audio/video recording,
data uploading). This framework tried to enhance network
security by recognizing known behaviors and alerting about
unknown ones. To build application-level models from packet
headers, HomeSnitch used adudump [126] traffic analysis tool.
After that, 13 different features were extracted to describe
application data exchanges. The authors used YourThings
dataset [127] for solution testing, with Random Forest giving
the best results: 99.69% accuracy, 93.93% F1-Score, 96.82%
TPR, and 11.96% UBMR (Unknown Behavior Miss Rate). To
force network access control based on the classification, the
system was built upon the SDN paradigm.
In the last group of works dealing with device type of model
identification, we can find the work of Ortiz et al. [18]. They
presented DeviceMien, a probabilistic framework for device
identification based on network data. This solution considered
stacked LSTM-autoencoders to automatically learn features
and classes from raw TCP packets. Then, the system modeled,
using DBSCAN optimized through Bayesian Modeling, each
device as a distribution of the generated classes. For testing, the
authors used two different datasets, one public, [4], and another
private. Previously seen devices classification reached over
99% accuracy for devices when using at least 50 samples. The
system could also distinguish between IoT and Non-IoT devices
by examining the average number of flow classes observed
over a set of samples. Besides, the correct class of unseen
devices was inferred with over 82% average F1-Score and 70%
accuracy by using a combination of OC-SVMs. Finally, Kotak
and Elovici [67] also performed IoT device type identification
based on network traffic. However, as a novel approach, the
authors performed a pre-processing step that converted the
TCP network traffic (pcap format) to grayscale images. Then,
an MLP was utilized to classify different device flows based
on the device type. The dataset utilized was from [4], and
this solution achieved over 99% accuracy when identifying 10
different types of network flows (9 classes for IoT devices and
1 class for non-IoT traffic).
From the previous solution analysis, we can observe that
the device type and model identification application scenario
has been covered from a communication network perspective.
Moreover, it is noticed that most of the solutions in this area
are focused on IoT, as the heterogeneous nature of IoT devices
motivates the usefulness of solutions capable of distinguishing
devices according to their type and model. Many solutions
achieve classification results over 99% in accuracy and F1-
Score metrics, which indicates that this area is relatively
covered by approaches with good performance. TABLE VI
compares the solutions focused on device type and model
identification.
B. Individual Device Identification
It analyzes behavior-based solutions focused on identifying
the device itself. It means that they differentiate devices with
the same hardware/software. At this point, it is important to
note that these approaches will also be able to distinguish
different device types and models (the previous category), and
this fact is also considered and evaluated in some of them. In
these solutions, features usually have a lower level, related
to hardware components, trying to differentiate fabrication
variations on the device components. TABLE VII compares
the solutions detailed in this subsection.
In this category we find the Salo’s work [81], who created
a fingerprinting software method capable of differentiating
identical personal computers using quartz crystals character-
istics. Concretely, the author utilized the CPU Time-Stamp
Counter (TSC), the Real-Time Clock (RTC), and the Sound
Card Digital Signal Processor (DSP). The solution aimed to
verify how accurate the RTC (/dev/rtc) and DSP (/dev/dsp)
were in terms of CPU cycles. To measure this accuracy, the
solution measured the one-second ticks of the RTC and the
time needed by the DSP to process one second of audio. A
test was launched for one hour to store repeated measurements
of thirty-eight computers from the same lab with the same
CPU and software. The statistical analysis results showed that
RTC measurements were able to differentiate the 98.5% of
pair machines, and DSP measurements were able to distinguish
the 93.3%. Also exploiting processor differences, but based on
execution time, Sanchez-Rola et al. [82] proposed CryptoFP, a
novel approach to identify machines with the same software
and hardware through the generation of a fingerprint using
the time taken to execute a specific function. This fingerprint
was generated locally without network traffic or external time
stamps. CryptoFP was composed of two phases, the generation
of a fingerprint from the timing of the code execution and the
determination of whether two fingerprints belong to the same
machine through fingerprint comparison. The fingerprinting
process was based on the generation of a matrix nxm, where
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Work Year DeviceType Approach Algorithms
Behavior
Source Features Dataset Classes Results
[62] 2016 ICS Classification ANN, NB Network Responsedelay times Private Device Model
99% and 92% accuracy for response and
operation time recognition, respectively.
[12] 2017 IoTDevices Classification RF Network
Packet
header-based [12] Device Type
81.5% average accuracy on 27 devices,
over 95% for 17 of them.
[50] 2018 IoTDevices Classification
Gradient boosting,
k-NN, DT Network
Header and
payload statistics Private Device Type 99% average accuracy and 86-99% TPR
[66] 2018 IoTDevices Classification t-SNE, RF Network Flow statistics Private Device Type
99.9% accuracy differentiating sensor,
camera, bulb, and plug devices.
[13] 2018 IoTDevices Classification RF Network Ping timestamps Private
Emulated
Device
Detection
Detection rate of 99.5% using 25 pings
and 99.9% using 200 pings.
[27] 2018 IoTDevices Classification RF, SVM, MLP Network
Clock skew and
timestamp features Private Device Model
97.03% precision, 94.64% recall and
99.76% accuracy identifying 51 models.
[49] 2018
SDN apps
/ IoT
Devices
Classification k-means, RF Network IoT protocolflows statistics Private Device Type
97% accuracy, +97% F1-Score (14/16
classes)
[6] 2019 IoTDevices Classification Clustering + k-NN Network
Flow periods
(DFT)
To be
published Device Type
F1-Score above 90% for 21/23 labels
and 98.2% overall accuracy.
[4] 2019 IoTDevices Classification RF Network
Flow and
packet statistics [4] Device Model 99.88% accuracy 5.06% RRSE.
[48] 2019 IoTDevices Classification
RF, k-NN,
Gradient Boosting Network
Data exchange
statistics [127]
Device
Behavior Type
99.69% accuracy, 93.93% F1-Score and
96.82% TPR.
[18] 2019 IoTDevices Classification
LSTM-
autencoders,
DBSCAN,
OC-SVM
Network
Derived from
raw packets
using LSTM-
autoencoders
Private
/ [4] Device Model
Seen devices: 99% accuracy. Unseen
devices: 82% F1-Score and 70%
accuracy.
[67] 2020 IoTDevices Classification DNN Network
Images generated
from raw data [4] Device Type
99% accuracy identifying 10 network
flow types (9 IoT and 1 non-IoT).
TABLE VI: Device type or model identification solutions based on device behavior fingerprinting.
n is the number of function calls to measure and m is the
number of times this process is repeated. In the fingerprint
comparison, the tool considered the most frequent (mode) time
values for each call parameter over all iterations. The authors
conducted several experiments to test long-term fingerprint
stability, and CPU workload and temperature impact in the
fingerprint generation. The solution was able to differentiate
two sets of identical machines, one with 89 computers and
the other with 176, with 100% uniqueness in host execution.
Besides, the solution achieved +80% uniqueness in web browser
execution. The authors considered as solution drawback that
the proposal can generate scalability problems as fingerprints
are compared one by one.
Based on clock skew capabilities, Jana and Kasera [55]
worked on uniquely differentiate wireless access points (AP).
The objective was to detect unauthorized wireless devices
based on their beacon frame timestamps. This work utilized
the uw/sigcomm2004 dataset [128]. From a set (50-100) of
timestamp differences between APs and a receiver, Linear
Programming Method (LPM) and Least Square Fitting (LSF)
were utilized to generate a clock skew value. The results, using
Expectation Maximization statistical algorithm to compare AP
frames, indicated that clock skew seems to be an efficient
and robust fingerprinting method capable of detecting different
WLAN APs. Similar results to the previous ones were presented
by Sharma et al. in [57]. In this case, the authors utilized TCP
and ICMP timestamp headers to calculate the clock skew
between two devices. The authors utilized the work of Kohno
et al. [54] as basis for clock skew calculation, validating it.
They tested their approach with 210 different devices, some
of them identical, finding that at least 70 packets were needed
to generate a consistent skew measurement. They were able
to distinguish both different and identical devices. Besides,
they also tested clock skew stability based on the measurement
methodology and on several environmental factors, such as
temperature or operating system. Finally, this work checked
how clock skew does not variate significantly when the device
operating system varies or with NTP updates (only for TCP
timestamps). Based on these results, the authors concluded that
this approach is suitable for moderate size networks.
Focused on wireless unique device identification, Lanze
et al. [56] considered clock skew stability and uniqueness.
To measure the clock skew, the authors took two kinds of
timestamps, the timestamps from a wireless AP (sender) sent
in wireless beacons and the timestamps from the measuring
wireless client (receiver). To carry out their experiments, they
gathered clock skews using five different laptops with different
Wi-Fi chipsets from 388 different APs. In addition, they ran
the experiment in different areas for increasing the number
of samples. Through their experiments, they concluded that
all clock skews were in a rather short range between -30
ppm and +30 ppm due to restrictions of the suppliers’ quality
specifications. It comes out that clock skew alone cannot serve
as a unique fingerprint for wireless access points. Therefore,
although the clock skew restricts the set of possible devices, it
cannot serve as a unique fingerprint for a wireless access point
and has to be enriched with other features to achieve uniqueness.
In the same line, Radhakrishnan et al. [65] published GTID,
a system for individual wireless device and device type
fingerprinting based on clock skew. This approach utilized clock
skew and communication patterns to generate device signatures
based on a time series approach. The system was tested using
a previous dataset of the team [129], [130], collected from 37
different devices, including some repeated models. To evaluate
the signatures, ANNs were utilized achieving from 99 to
95% average accuracy and 74% average recall on device ID
classification, and 86% average accuracy and 68% average
recall on device type classification. Similarly to [56] and [65],
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Polcˇa´k et al. [53], [58] also discussed clock skew performance
when uniquely identifying different devices. Here, the authors
concluded that clock skew is not completely stable. Besides,
based on the clock skew distribution of the evaluated devices,
the authors claimed that clock manufacturers pretend to achieve
0 ppm clock skew, so skews are distributed close to 0 ppm.
These factors prevent a quick fingerprint technique to be capable
of uniquely differentiate devices in large scenarios. Finally,
the authors also discussed and demonstrated the possibility
of masquerading or falsifying the clock skew. The authors
concluded that this technique might be suitable for small
networks or in combination with additional data.
On the other hand, a solution exploiting resource usage
was proposed in [28]. In this work, the authors developed a
fingerprinting method based on the CPU usage graph when
the device is executing a fixed task. For this purpose, a
benchmark program that included several read/write operations
and calculations was developed. To fingerprint each device,
128 CPU usage measurements, one every 0.2 seconds (25.6
seconds in total), were utilized to generate a usage graph.
For testing, ten identical PCs were used. In the evaluation
process, the graph was compared to the previous ones of
the same device using the Dynamic Time Warping algorithm.
The percentage of stable fingerprints was calculated using
the Shannon entropy and stability measurement, achieving a
93.43% of unique fingerprints.
Other works solved the identical device identification prob-
lem using electromagnetic signals as data source. Using radio
signals, Jafari et al. [14] used MLPs, CNNs, LSTMs to identify
wireless devices and distinguish among identical wireless
devices from the same manufacturer. The authors used ZigBee
devices from which a historical radio frequency trace dataset
was obtained. In total, six identical devices were employed in
the tests. Accuracy results were: 96.3% for MLP, 94.7% for
CNN, and 75% for LSTM. Finally, the authors concluded that it
was possible to identify devices based on their radio frequency
traces, even if they were from the same model. A similar
approach was addressed in [59], where Riyaz et al. utilized
raw radio samples to build a unique device signature using
Software Defined Radio (SDR) transmissions. This solution
achieved 98% accuracy when identifying 5 identical devices
using a CNN classifier. Other algorithms, such as SVM and
Logistic Regression were also tested, achieving worse results.
In addition, the authors analyzed how detection accuracy is
impacted by measuring distance, concluding that classification
performance starts to degrade at 34 feet.
Finally, Cheng et al. proposed in [61] a method capable
of identifying identical laptops and smartphone devices (also
different models) based on the electromagnetic signals radiated
from the CPU. Using Extra-Trees classifier (a variant of
Random Forest), the authors achieved 99.1% average precision
and recall for all devices tested (70), and more than 98.6%
precision and recall for 30 identical devices, using one round
fingerprint. With multi-round, results were enhanced to 99.9%
in the previous metrics. The authors mentioned as a drawback
that this solution requires the use of an external sensor to
measure the CPU radiated signals within a 16 mm range.
As a general view of individual device identification so-
lutions, it can be appreciated that solutions are focused
on general computers and wireless devices. This ensures
solution universality, but opens the door to future perspectives
focused on more specific device types such as IoT or ICS.
It is also noticed the lower-level nature of the behavior
sources utilized, which in this case are mainly based on clock
and processor properties, and electromagnetic signals. Many
solutions achieved high individual identification performance.
However, many of these approaches noticed scalability issues in
large device deployments, as fabrication variations are limited
within determined quality standards. TABLE VII compares the
solutions focused on individual device identification.
C. Attack Detection
The third main scenario where behavior fingerprinting is
highly relevant is in attack detection. These abnormal situations
can have a wide range of forms, such as network attacks,
malware, malicious firmware modifications, or unauthorized
user interactions. Detection can be performed either by mod-
eling normal device behavior and detecting deviations, from
an anomaly detection standpoint, or collecting normal and
abnormal labeled data and performing classification tasks.
TABLE VIII compares the solutions detailed in this subsection.
The most exploited source in terms of behavior-based
attack detection is network monitoring. Many solutions, mainly
focused on IoT [69], [9], [63], [76], [7], [10], [15], [68], [77],
[131], [5], [32], [51] but also on SDN/NFV [70], [71] and
general computers [73], [74], [72], [64], have utilized this
source for attack detection.
In [69], the authors worked on unauthorized IoT device
detection using white lists and classification ML algorithms.
TCP/IP flows were used to identify nine different types of
devices (17 distinct IoT devices were used). In total, 274
features extracted from application, transport, and network
layers served to classify the device type using Random Forest.
This classification was performed over 20 consecutive network
sessions, and then the majority rule was applied over the
classification results to decide the device type. IoT device types
not white-listed were correctly detected as unknown in 96% of
cases (on average), and white-listed device types were correctly
classified as their actual type in 99% of cases. This work also
discussed the resilience to adversarial attacks, concluding that
the system would be resilient to malware infections. In the
same line, Ferrando and Stacey [9] built a behavior profile
of IoT devices based on entropy and dispersion of metrics
related to IP directions, ports, bytes received/sent, and latency.
Anomalies were detected based on the distance between the
average values and the current ones. The authors proposed
different evaluation approaches such as Euclidean Distance and
AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA), but no
performance metrics were given using actual data. Amouri et al.
[63] proposed an IDS based on IoT device network behavior.
This system had a distributed architecture composed of traffic
sniffers in the local network and a central super node. Device
behavior was built on packet counters determined by MAC
and network layer data. The proposed architecture had two
levels, a first one where traffic sniffers applied DT algorithm
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Work Year Device Type Approach Algorithms BehaviorSource Features Dataset Classes Results
[81] 2007 Generalcomputers Classification Statistical
System
processors
and oscillators
RTC and DSP
drift compared
to the TSC
Private Differentphysical devices
98.5% and 93.3% of computer
differentiation using RTC and DSP,
respectively.
[82] 2018 Generalcomputers Classification
Statistical
(Mode)
System
processors
Matrix of code
execution times Private
Different
physical devices
100% host-based and +80% web-based
device identification.
[55] 2009 Wirelessaccess points Classification
Expectation
Maximization Clock skew
Wi-Fi beacons
timestamps [128] Known APs
Clock skew is a robust method and
can detect different WLAN APs.
[57] 2012 Generalcomputers Classification Statistical Clock skew
TCP and ICMP
timestamp Private
Different
physical devices
Identical and different devices correctly
identified.
[56] 2012 Wirelessdevices Data analysis Statistical Clock skew
Wi-Fi beacons
timestamps Private
Different
physical devices
Clock skew is not enough to uniquely
identify a large set of devices.
[65] 2014 Wirelessdevices Classification ANN
Clock skew
+ Network
Communi-
cation skew
and patterns
[129]
Individual
devices and
device type
From 99 to 95% accuracy and 74%
recall on ID, and 86% accuracy and
68% recall on type classification.
[58] 2015 Generalcomputers Data analysis Statistical Clock skew
TCP
timestamps Private
Different
physical devices
Clock skew identification is only
suitable for small networks or
combined with other data.
[28] 2019 Generalcomputers Classification
Dynamic
Time Warping Resource usage
CPU usage-
based graph Private Physical devices
93.43% of uniqueness in the generated
fingerprints of 10 identical devices
[14] 2018 Wirelessdevices Classification
MLP, CNN,
LSTM
Electromagnetic
signals
Radio
frequency
IQ samples
Private Differentphysical devices
96.3% accuracy for MLP, 94.7%
for CNN and 75% for LSTM when
identifying 6 identical ZigBee devices.
[59] 2018 Wirelessdevices Classification CNN
Electromagnetic
signals
Raw frequency
IQ samples Private
Different
physical devices
98% accuracy is achieved when
identifying 5 identical devices.
[61] 2019 Laptops andSmartphones Classification Extra-Trees
Electromagnetic
signals
CPU radiated
magnetic
signals
Private Differentphysical devices
99.1% average precision and recall for
all devices (70), and >98.6% precision
and recall for 30 identical devices.
TABLE VII: Individual device identification solutions based on device behavior fingerprinting (works are grouped by behavior
source, using double horizontal lines to separate them, and sorted by year).
to classify network instances, and a second one where a super
node applied Linear Regression to generate time-based device
profiles relying on the measure of behavior fluctuation. After
3000s (3 reports to the super node), the system achieved 100%
detection (TPR).
A different view was provided by Yin et al. [73], who applied
deep learning for botnet behavior modeling and detection.
This solution was based on a GAN that generates simulated
data, augmenting the model trained with the original data.
The authors utilized network flows as device behavior source,
deriving statistical features such as flow duration, packet
length, or total bits transmitted. The authors utilized ISCX
botnet dataset [132] as benchmark, achieving 74.04% precision,
71.17% accuracy, 70.59% F1-Score, and 15.59% TPR. In
[74], the authors proposed a behavior anomaly detection
system based on network traffic. The system gave a distributed
vision of large networks, so the data was stored using a
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), and the processing
was based on distributed training using Apache Spark. The
traffic flows were processed using a Deep Belief Network
(DBN) for dimensionality reduction technique, and then a
stacked layer SVM was used as classifier. The system was
tested using different datasets, including KDD99 [133], NSL-
KDD [134], UNSW NB-15 [135], and CIC-IDS 2017 [136].
The achieved F1-Score ranged from 93% to 97%. Traffic-
based anomaly detection is covered by a wide variety of
other works using anomaly detection approaches [70], [76].
The solution presented in [72] also considered unsupervised
anomaly detection based on network traffic data extracted
from the CIC-IDS 2017 [136] dataset. This work was focused
on cybersecurity and attack detection. Traffic sequences were
modeled in sliding windows that were fed to RNNs. Concretely,
the proposed architecture had an embedding layer that projects
the sequence values into a dense 50-dimensional vector. This
layer was followed by two LSTM layers with dropout, and
finally, a dense layer. This approach achieved over 71% AUC
in all the evaluated attacks and 87% AUC average. The authors
draw that the results obtained may not be encouraging enough,
and further research is needed in this area. Similarly, Haefner
and Ray presented ComplexIoT in [7], a behavioral framework
designed to evaluate each traffic flow in an IoT device and
calculate a trust score for it. The authors collected traffic of
25 devices approximately (general computers, smartphones,
IoT devices). Flows were aggregated in 30 minutes (15
seconds without a packet ends the flow). Based on the Flow
Trust Score of each connection, calculated using IF, different
policies and rules are applied to mitigate possible attacks. This
solution is deployed on an enforcement architecture as an SDN
environment based on OpenFlow.
Hamza et al. [10] proposed an approach based on Manufac-
turer Usage Descriptions (MUD) to enhance IoT security. In
this case, the solution was based on an SDN architecture. The
authors generated and published a dataset with benign network
activity and traces of several network attacks such as ARP
spoofing, TCP SYN, and UDP flooding or reflection attack.
Flow counters are used to generate feature vectors, applying
PCA and k-means for dimensionality reduction and clustering,
respectively. Then, an anomaly detection approach based
on boundary detection and Markov Chains achieved 94.9%
accuracy, 89.7% TPR, and 5.1% FPR, improving previous
existing methods such as Snort IDS [137]. Another approach
using MUDs to improve IoT security was proposed by Afek et
al. in [71]. From an NFV perspective, this work implemented
a framework to be deployed on a service provider level. This
proposal presented a hybrid approach where MUD compliance
checking is a service implemented as a virtual network function
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(VNF), and traffic monitoring is implemented on the network
gateway to ensure P2P communications. For devices with no
MUD, the authors used the algorithm proposed in [138] for
generating MUD files from network flows.
In [68], the authors used network-flow data to extract flow-
based features capable of creating device type fingerprints.
Then, unknown or suspicious devices with abnormal behavior
could be identified, and their communication was restricted for
further monitoring. To create a fingerprint for each device, the
authors extracted unique behavioral and flow-based features
from the header and payload of network packets. The dataset
used for testing came from IoT Sentinel [12]. Several ML
classification algorithms were tested to distinguish device types,
achieving an average accuracy of 90.3% with Random Forest.
A similar approach was followed in [77], where the authors
performed attack and anomaly classification using the DS2OS
dataset [139]. This dataset is based on a virtual IoT environment
where devices communicate with each other using the MQTT
protocol. Different ML and DL classification algorithms were
tested after some data pre-processing. The algorithm that best
performed when classifying normal traces and different attacks
was Random Forest with a 99% F1-Score. In the same line,
Lima et al. [64] presented an approach for detecting DoS/DDoS
attacks using ML techniques. The authors built a customized
attack dataset based on several public datasets (CIC-DoS, CIC-
IDS2017, and CIC-IDS2018 [136]) to benchmark normal traffic
and different DoS/DDoS classification. Random Forest achieved
an online detection rate (DR) of attacks above 96%, with high
F1-Score (99.5%) and low false alarm rate (0.2%) using a
sampling rate (SR) of 20% of network traffic.
On similar research paths, Ferna´ndez et al. [131] analyzed
ransomware detection based on behavior analysis in Medical
Cyber-Physical Systems (MCPS). This work analyzed network
flows in 10-second windows and extracted different statistical
features. Then, anomaly detection and classification ML models
are combined to evaluate the live generated vectors. OC-SVM
was utilized for anomaly detection and NB for classification.
Then, based on the model outputs, different rules were defined.
The system achieved 95.96% F1-Score, 92.32% precision,
99.97% recall, and 4.6% FPR for anomaly detection, and
+99% accuracy for ransomware classification. Sivanathan et al.
[5] also addressed behavioral changes and attack monitoring.
This proposal relied on flow and packet network analysis to
perform traffic modeling based on clustering. The authors
applied PCA for dimensionality reduction and k-means for
clustering. This solution achieved 84.3%, 89.4%, 91.3%, and
86.2% of average detection rate for ARP Spoofing, Ping of
Death, TCP SYN flooding, and Fraggle, respectively. For
reflection attacks, the rate of detection for Smurf, SNMP, SSDP,
and TCP SYN reflection attacks was 99.1%, 58.8%, 88.5%,
and 92.0%, respectively.
From a distributed perspective, the authors of [15] used
federated learning to build DoT, an autonomous self-learning
distributed system for detecting compromised IoT devices. The
system created communication profiles for each device based
on network packets and flows, being able to identify different
device types. Then, an anomaly detection-based approach was
applied to detect changes in the device behavior, detecting
network attacks. The architecture was deployed using a network
gateway (router) as the Anomaly Detection component. Besides,
an IoT Security Service was in charge of maintaining a
repository of GRU models. A number of 30 IoT devices
and an installation of the Mirai botnet were employed to
test the platform, obtaining a 95.6% attack detection rate and
fast (≈257 ms) compromised device detection. The authors
claimed that the models and datasets will be made public
in the future. Another distributed solution was proposed in
[32], in which Ali et al. submitted an IoT device behavior
capturing system powered by blockchain and designed to
enable trust-level confidence to outside networks. The authors
deployed a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [140] to
provide a secure execution environment for sensitive code and
blockchain data. The data came from the N-BaIoT dataset
[141] and contained network features related to benign and
botnet attack flows. ANNs were utilized for behavior modeling
and to continuously detect abnormal behavior. This method
was compared to other ML anomaly detection algorithms, such
as IF and OC-SVM. For testing, a Mirai botnet-based DDoS
attack was applied, achieving 99.2% TPR and 175 ± 230ms
detection time. Similarly, Blaise et al. [51] presented a bot
detection technique based on the host behavior. This solution
was divided into three steps: characterizing the host behavior
based on network signatures (aggregated attribute frequency
distribution), inferring benign host behavior using clustering
algorithms (DBSCAN), and classifying new hosts based on
previously labeled instances (assigning the closest cluster center
to new instances). Concretely, nine features regarding IPs, ports,
and headers were extracted from network flows using TCP,
UDP, and ICMP packets. To validate the approach, the authors
used the CTU-13 dataset [142], where a 100% TPR and 0.9%
FPR were obtained when detecting botnet activities.
Regarding sensor measurements to detect attacks, the main
solutions based on this approach are applied to ICS environ-
ments [20], [91], [92]. The authors of [20] performed anomaly
detection in cyber-physical systems (CPS), using GANs and
time series data. From this perspective, the authors built an
unsupervised GAN framework based on LSTM networks. This
approach achieved 99.99% precision, 99.98% recall, and 77%
F1-Score using SWaT dataset [143], 46.98% precision, 99.99%
recall and 37% F1-Score using the WADI dataset [144], and
94.92% precision, 96.33% recall, and 94% F1-Score using
the KDD99 dataset [133]. Note that the previous results were
obtained in different executions choosing the given metric to
optimize. The previous results were improved by Neha et al.
[92], where a behavioral-based IDS for ICSs, in this case for
SCADA systems, was proposed. This approach applied RNNs
to detect cyber-physical attacks. The model received sensor
measurements gathered from the SWaT dataset [143], achieving
98.05% accuracy and 97% TPR when classifying normal and
injected data. Zhanwei and Zenghui [91] proposed an anomaly
detection system for ICSs based on the behavior of the data
sequences from the industrial control Modbus/TCP network
traffic. The authors tested their system both in a simulated water
tank scenario and in a real chemical mixing infrastructure. This
approach utilized sensor measurements to generate a behavior
model and predict future behavior. Results showed 5.5-6.4%
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FPR and 11-17% FNR when detecting different tampering and
MitM attacks through a linear model.
Some other solutions rely on system calls, execution logs, and
software signatures to model device activity and detect attack
situations [84], [86], [33], [85], [90]. These solutions cover
a wide range of device types, including resource-constrained
devices, general computers, and cloud systems. Gideon Creech
[84] developed an IDS based on system call patterns. The
authors utilized a semantic approach over the system call traces
to understand running programs and detect anomalies. A Linux
system was monitored under different types of vulnerability
exploitation attacks, and the dataset was made publicly available
as ADFA-LD [84]. Several tests were carried out utilizing an
Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) and the semantic features
extracted from the system calls, achieving 100% TPR and 0.6%
FPR. Also covering cloud intrusion detection using system
calls, in [86], the authors developed a HIDS for IaaS cloud
solutions that utilized system calls and Hidden Markov Models
(HMM) to build a normal behavior profile. Then, the HMM
was used as classifier achieving 97% accuracy, 100% detection
rate, and 5.66% FPR. In [85], Deshpande et al. faced with
cloud computing intrusion detection based on system calls.
The authors gathered system calls using audit framework and
aggregated them in time windows to calculate call frequency
vectors. Then, a k-NN classifier was used to decide if a vector
was abnormal. The solution achieved 90% accuracy and 96%
TPR. However, TNR was only 42.5%.
From a different perspective, Attia et al. proposed in [33]
an adaptive host-based anomaly detection framework for
resource-constrained devices. The designed use case targeted
the detection of malicious updates on Android applications.
The framework collected the system calls of the monitored
applications by using Strace. Then, it generated a normal
behavioral model for each monitored application. This normal
profile was defined using short sequences of system calls using
n-gram language models. Then, look-ahead, n-gram tree, and
varied-length n-grams algorithms were tested for anomaly
detection. Performance varies depending on the algorithm,
look-ahead achieved the best detection rate of ≈70% and
zero FPR, while n-gram tree achieved the best results in CPU
and RAM consumption. The resource consumption of this
solution is 20-50% CPU and <8% RAM. Additionally, for
IoT security improvement, He et al. [90] proposed BoSMoS,
a distributed software status monitoring system enabled by
blockchain. The system was designed for Industrial IoT (IIoT)
and aimed to detect malicious behaviors based on software
modifications. To accomplish its goal, the system generated a
snapshot of the device software and monitored its system file
calls. Blockchain was used as a trusted decentralized database
to store trusted software snapshots. Then, in each IIoT device a
monitoring module was deployed to generate system software
snapshots based on the executable and users’ profiles. This
module also monitored file calls. Hence, when target software
was accessed, the module checked its authenticity instantly.
The system performance was measured based on the delay
to detect modified files. It was executed in 300s intervals, so
modified software did not run for more than these 300s. Finally,
the authors also tested solution scalability, performance, and
security.
Apart from the behavioral data considered by the previous
solutions, other works such as [78], [80], [79] used Hardware
Performance Counters (HPC) to model system behavior. These
solutions focused on resource-constrained devices such as
embedded systems and IoT devices. In [78], the authors
presented ConFirm, a technique to identify device behavior and
detect malicious modifications in the firmware of embedded
systems. This technique is based on the monitoring of the
number of low-level hardware events that occur during firmware
execution using HPCs. To avoid the disablement of the system,
it was installed as a legacy bootloader extension. Deviations,
based on execution paths, were calculated to evaluate the system
performance. The proposal was tested on ARM and PowerPC
embedded processors, verifying that the solution was able to
detect all the tested modifications with low resource overhead.
In [80], Golomb et al. proposed CIoTA (Collaborative IoT
Anomaly Detection), a lightweight framework using blockchain
to perform distributed and collaborative anomaly detection in
resource-constrained devices. In this solution, an Extended
Markov Model (EMM) captured an application control-flow
asynchronously using HPCs. Attack informing blocks were
submitted to the blockchain (validated by neighbor devices)
to ensure that an attacker cannot exploit a large number
of devices within a short period of time. The system was
tested in an IoT platform composed of 48 Raspberry Pi
simulating smart cameras and lights. An exploit was executed
to simulate a bot behavior in some devices. Results showed
that using 20 models, consensus can easily detect the attack,
achieving a zero false positive ratio. The authors also mentioned
some countermeasures, such as alerts, service restart, or
poweroff. Ott and Mahapatra [79] utilized HPCs and their
occurrence frequency to enable continuous authentication of
embedded software. For this purpose, the HPCs streams were
processed using Short-Time Fourier Transforms (STFT) to
extract frequency information. The authors discussed the usage
of classifiers; however, they considered these models too
heavy for embedded systems and chose to build their own
authentication algorithm. This algorithm started with a 512
data point window, then a Hanning window function was used,
and its output was given to the STFT algorithm. Then, a
threshold was defined to transform the frequencies to 256 bits.
Finally, a cyclic redundancy check (CRC-8) function reduced
the output to 8 bits. These 8 bits were used to build the
system authentication state machine, which was responsible
for performing the authentication process, achieving 97% TPR
and 1.5% FPR in a Linux system.
An alternative approach to detect anomalies caused by attacks
consists in resource usage monitoring [3], [21], [11], mainly
in cloud and container systems. Shone et al. proposed in [3]
a misbehavior monitoring solution for cluster-based systems.
This solution utilized resource usage metrics together with
process and file modification monitoring to model the system
behavior. Anomaly detection was addressed based on thresholds,
clustering, and statistical similarity calculation. In a simulated
environment, the authors achieved 0.11% FPR and 0% FNR
detecting DoS attacks, consuming 0.5% RAM and 14% of
CPU. Similarly, Barbhuiya et al. proposed in [21] a DDoS and
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cryptomining attack detection framework for cloud data centers.
The solution, called RADS (Real-time Anomaly Detection
System), monitored CPU and network utilization over time to
detect resource usage anomalies. The anomaly detection process
was done using the CPU usage percentage and network usage
as a time series. Then, different window-based approaches
were applied to perform attack identification. Raw data was
collected with a 5 seconds frequency and grouped in one-
minute windows, calculating the measurements average and
standard deviation. Attack detection was performed using Spike
detection analysis based on the IQR. A real-world testing
dataset was gathered from [145], containing measurements from
Bitbrains data center. Evaluation results achieved 90-95% F1-
Score and 0-3% FPR when detecting DDoS and cryptomining
attacks. On the other hand, the authors of [11] presented an
anomaly detection mechanism based on resource behavior
designed to identify when a cloud system should be auto-
scaled. The system design considered CPU, network, and disk
usage. However, in the testing deployment, only CPU resources
were used. To detect anomalies, an AutoRegressive (AR) model
was trained, and the prediction error (MSE, RMSE, MAE) on
the test dataset was used as anomaly measurement. The system
was only tested using two DoS and stress example attacks,
detecting both of them. No additional experiments are carried
out to evaluate system performance.
Based on the attack detection solution analysis, we can claim
that attack detection is the most varied behavior application
scenario. Although network is the most used source, others
such as system calls or resource usage also have notable
relevance. The same heterogeneous distribution can be observed
regarding processing and evaluation approaches, having a
balance between classification and anomaly detection. The
concrete sources and techniques applied are related to the type
of attacks addressed. Thus, although many solutions achieved
successful results, the rapid evolution of attack techniques leads
to the need for new future solutions in this area. The main
characteristics of the attack detection solutions are summarized
in TABLE VIII.
D. Malfunction and Fault Detection
The last behavior application scenario identified is malfunc-
tion and fault detection. In these solutions, the purpose is to
detect faulty devices or malfunctioning components based on
device behavior changes. This approach has been applied to
several device types, such as IoT [75], [52], ICSs [8], NFV
systems [87], [83], [47], [95], general computers [88], cloud
systems [34], [94], and containers [96], [16], [97]. TABLE IX
compares the solutions detailed in this subsection.
Choi et al. [75] addressed faulty IoT devices identification
based on behavior fingerprinting from sensor data and its
correlation. This solution was named DICE, and it was installed
in the network gateway to collect sensor data and extract some
context from it. Using statistical features for a vector distance-
based evaluation, the system achieved an average precision
of 94.9% and 92.5% recall, and 3 minute average time to
detect faults. In the same line, Spanos et al. [52], under EU
H2020 Project GHOST, proposed a security solution based on
the generation of behavioral templates using the IoT device
network communications. After a dimensionality reduction
using PCA, clustering algorithms (DBSCAN) were applied
to the network data to detect abnormal devices. Based on
Euclidean distance, devices located far from a cluster center
generated an alert and triggered some mitigation actions. This
proposal was validated under simulated physical damage and
mechanical exhaustion anomalies. Besides, Manco et al. [8]
explored ICS fault detection based on sensor stream data
analysis. The system performed window-based processing to
obtain statistical features, and then clustering to build classes
from unlabeled data. Finally, outlier detection was performed to
distinguish failures using Expectation Maximization algorithm.
This approach was tested in train door failure detection,
achieving 89.5% AUC.
From a system log perspective, in [87], the authors applied
a multimodal LSTM network approach to perform anomaly
detection in NFV microservices based on distributed execution
traces. They obtained over 90% accuracy using real-word cloud
traces. Kubacki et al. [88] explored abnormal behavior detection
based on system logs related to performance metrics such as
system interrupts rate per second, data transfer rate, CPU
queue length, and memory usage. The authors performed a
pulse-oriented time series analysis to characterize periodical
behaviors and detect anomalies. The evaluation was performed
using a self-developed algorithm called PANAL, which is based
on statistical analysis. The correlation between metrics was
also evaluated on real logs, finding a high correlation during
certain anomalous situations such as truncated cyberattacks or
data backups. As this was a data analysis work, the authors
did not provide metrics regarding system performance when
detecting anomalous behaviors.
When it comes to malfunction and fault detection, the most
common data source is resource usage, especially for fault
finding in cloud and container systems. In this context, Gulenko
et al. [83] proposed an anomaly detection architecture for large-
scale NFV systems. In this proposal, different resource usage
metrics were collected from each host, including CPU and
RAM usage, disk I/O operations, and network I/O activity.
To keep a low resource consumption, the solution collected
between 130 and 180 metrics easily accessed on a typical
Linux machine, parsing the /proc file system in short time
intervals (300 ms). To process the data, the architecture used
techniques based on online unsupervised clustering and classifi-
cation algorithms capable of handling continuous data streams.
Multiple analysis steps were chained together and executed on
different hosts to achieve scalability. The authors claimed that
the preliminary evaluation of the collected data showed a high
degree of reliable recognition of pre-defined failure scenarios,
exceeding 95%. In addition, Sorkunlu, Chandola, and Patra
[96] published a method to track the behavior of a cluster
system based on its resource usage. The used resource usage
metrics were CPU, disk I/O, HPCs, network I/O, and virtual
memory. Data was grouped into three-dimensional tensors
(compute nodes, usage metrics, and time). To measure behavior
changes, data was grouped in ten-minute time windows and
dimensionality reduction algorithms were applied. Finally, the
reconstruction error was measured. The experiments used the
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Work Year DeviceType Approach Algorithms
Behavior
Source Features Dataset Attack Type Results
[69] 2017 IoTDevices Classification RF Network
Flow-based
statistics Private
Untargeted /
targeted attacks 99-96% accuracy
[9] 2017 IoTDevices Classification
ARIMA,
Euclidean
distance
Network Headerstatistics Private
Unusual changes
and attacks
Anomalies visualized based on
behavioral distance.
[63] 2018 IoTDevices Classification
DT, Linear
Regression Network
Mac and
network layer
counters
Private Trafficanomalies
100% detection (TPR) after 3000s (3
reports).
[73] 2018 Generalcomputers Classification GAN Network
Traffic flow
statistics [132] Botnet behavior
74.04% precision, 71.17% accuracy,
70.59% F1-Score, 15.59% TPR for
botnet activity detection.
[74] 2018 Generalcomputers Classification
(Spark) DBN
and SVM Network
Traffic flow
statistics
[133], [134],
[135], [136] Network attacks
93-97% F1-Score in the tested
datasets.
[70] 2018 SDN AnomalyDetection
SVM,
kNN, MLP Network Traffic statistics Private
DDoS, port-scan
and flash crowd Attacks were detected and mitigated
[72] 2018 Generalnetworks
Anomaly
Detection LSTM Network Traffic flows [136]
Network and
application
attacks
87% AUC average, over 71% AUC in
all attacks.
[76] 2019 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection
RPNI +
RANSAC Network
Application-
layer series Private IoT anomalies
The attacks are discovered with high
accuracy.
[7] 2019 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection IF Network Flow statistics Private
DDoS and
botnets
Different device confidence based on
behavior Flow Trust Score.
[10] 2019 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection
PCA, k-means,
Markov Chains Network Flow counters [10] Network attacks
94.9% accuracy, 89.7% TPR, and 5.1%
FPR.
[71] 2019 NFV AnomalyDetection
While-listing
(MUD) Network Traffic flows Private
Unauthorized
connections Unknown connections forbidden
[68] 2019 IoTDevices Classification RF Network
Flow-based
statistics [12]
Attack
prevention
90.3% accuracy using RF, outperform-
ing other ML algorithms.
[77] 2019 IoTDevices Classification
SVM, RF,
ANN, LR Network
MQTT-traces
features [139]
DoS, control,
Scan
99% F1-Score classifying normal and
attack traces.
[64] 2019 Generalcomputers Classification RF Network
TCP/IP header
statistics [64] DoS/DDoS
96.5% attack detection rate, 99.5%
F1-Score, 0.2% FAR
[131] 2019 CPSs
Anomaly
Detection /
Classification
OC-SVM / NB Network Flow statistics Private Ransomwareattacks
95.9% F1-Score, 4.6% FPR in
anomaly detection, and +99%
classification accuracy.
[15] 2019 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection
(Fed. Learn.)
GRU Network
Header
statistics
To be
published IoT attacks
95.6% attack detection rate and fast
(≈257 ms) attack detection.
[5] 2020 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection PCA, k-means Network
Header
statistics [4], [10] Network attacks
91.3%-84.3% average detection rate
for direct attacks, and 99.1%-58.8%
for reflection attacks.
[32] 2020 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection
(Blockchain)
Neural Network Network Flow statistics [141] DDoS attacks
99.2% TPR and 175 ± 230ms to
attack detection.
[51] 2020 IoTDevices Classification DBSCAN Network
TCP, UDP,
ICMP headers [142]
Botnet detection
(and attacks) 100% TPR, 0.9% FPR
[20] 2019 ICSs AnomalyDetection
LSTM-based
GAN Sensors
Measurement
value
sequences
[143],
[144], [133]
Cyber-physical
attacks
99.99%-46.98% precision, 99.98%-
96.33% recall and 94%-37% F1-Score,
depending on the dataset.
[91] 2019 ICSs AnomalyDetection Linear model Sensors
Sensor
measurements Private
Tampering
and MitM 5.5-6.4% FPR and 11-17% FNR
[92] 2020 ICSs Classification RNN Sensors Sensor valuesequences [143]
Cyber-physical
attacks
98.05% accuracy and 97% TPR when
classifying normal and injected data.
[84] 2013 Generalcomputers
Anomaly
Detection ELM
System
calls
Semantic
features [84]
Vulnerability
exploitation 100% TPR and 0.6% FPR.
[86] 2013 Cloudsystems Classification HMM
System
calls
System calls
identifiers Private
Anomalous
system calls
97% accuracy, 100% detection rate,
and 5.66% FPR
[33] 2015 Mobiledevices
Anomaly
Detection
Look-ahead,
N-gram tree
System
calls Strace tool Private
Malicious
app updates
≈70% and zero FPR using look-ahead
algorithm.
[85] 2018 Cloudsystems Classification k-NN
System
calls
System call
traces collected
using audit
Private Anomalouscall sequences 90% accuracy, 96% TPR, 42.5% TNR
[90] 2020 IoTDevices
Distributed
Anomaly
Detection
Hash equality
checking
(Blockchain)
Software
signatures
Executable and
configurations
snapshots
Private
(Simulated)
Software
modification
Executable modification detection
within 300 seconds in the performed
tests.
[78] 2015 Embeddedsystems
Anomaly
Detection
Execution
path deviation
Hardware
Events HPCs Private
Firmware
modifications
The system is plactical with low
overhead
[80] 2018 IoTDevices
Anomaly
Detection
(Blockchain)
EMM
Hardware
Events
HPCs app
control-flow Private
Adversarial
attacks
Exploit execution easily identified,
enhancing network overall security.
[79] 2019 Embeddedsystems
Continuous
Authen-
tication
Own (Window +
Fourier + CRC)
Hardware
Events HPCs Private
Abnormal
software
97% TPR, 1.5% FPR in the
authentication of embedded software.
[3] 2013 Clustersystems
Anomaly
Detection
Threshold+
k-means +
statistical
Resource
usage
Hardware,
process and
file info
Private DoS attacks
0.11% FPR and 0% FNR detecting
DoS attacks, consuming only 0.5%
RAM and 14% of CPU.
[21] 2018 Cloud datacenters
Anomaly
Detection IQR
Resource
usage CPU, network [145]
DDoS,
Cryptomining 90-95% F1-Score and FPR of 0-3%
[11] 2018 Cloudsystems
Anomaly
Detection
Autoregressive
(AR) model
Resource
usage CPU Private
DoS, service
stress attack Attacks are fully detected
TABLE VIII: Main attack detection solutions based on device behavior fingerprinting (works are grouped by behavior source,
using double horizontal lines to separate them, and sorted by year).
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TACC Stats monitor, giving 86 different resource metrics, and
all anomalies were correctly detected. In [47], by the same
team that [83], the authors proposed an unsupervised detection
approach using the Online ARIMA [146] forecasting algorithm.
This model was based on predicting the next expected values
and comparing them with the actual ones. The used data
included CPU percentage, disk-io time and load, memory usage
and percentage, network-io bytes, packets, errors, and dropped
packets. Concretely, each metric was collected in a 500ms
loop. The authors introduced controlled anomalies such as disk
pollution, or HDD, CPU, and memory stress and leak. Results
showed up to a 100% accuracy in the anomaly detection. This
team also addressed black-box service modeling [95] based on
clustering to detect functioning anomalies like in the previous
work. The used clustering algorithm was BIRCH [147]. In this
work, almost all anomalies were detected perfectly, except for
the memory leak and CPU stress anomalies, which achieved
83% detection rate.
Following a similar approach, Wang et al. [34] proposed
a self-adaptive monitoring architecture for online anomaly
detection in cloud computing. The system gathered performance
metrics from different sources such as CPU, Network, Memory,
and Disk. Then, PCA was applied over these metrics, followed
by a sliding window to cache monitoring data. The evaluated
faults were CPU hog, network congestion, memory leak, and
disk interference. To calculate anomalies, the PCA-based
eigenvector of the evaluated metrics was compared to the
standard eigenvector. The adaptability could be achieved by
adjusting the sliding window based on the estimated anomaly
degree. A similar line to this work was covered by Agrawal et
al. [94], where similar features were collected and PCA was
used as dimensionality reduction algorithm. Here, the authors
achieved 88.54% accuracy and 86% F1-Score. Besides, Du et al.
[97] proposed a framework to monitor and classify anomalous
behaviors in microservices and containers. The framework
had a monitoring component that gathers data about CPU,
memory, and network resources and groups the measurements
in 30 second windows. Then, different anomalies, such as
high CPU consumption or memory leak, were injected, and
the generated data was labeled. In the experiments, k-NN
achieved the best results with an F1-Score between 97% and
93%. Finally, Samir and Pahl [16] utilized hierarchical hidden
Markov models (HHMM) to detect anomalies in container
clusters. Anomalies were detected based on CPU and memory
utilization. To test the system, anomalies based on resource
exhaustion and workload contention were injected. HHMM
model was compared with Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN)
and Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM), achieving the best
results in three different generated datasets: 95% F1-Score and
19% FAR for Dataset A, 95% F1-Score and 27% FAR for
Dataset B, and 90% F1-Score and 31% FAR for Dataset C.
From the description of the previous solutions, we can
observe that resource usage and system logs are the most used
behavior source for fault detection, especially in NFV, cloud,
containers, and microservice systems. In contrast, IoT devices
and ICSs faults have been solved based on a network and sensor-
based perspective. Moreover, most of the solutions are focused
on anomaly detection-based evaluation, instead of using labeled
data. TABLE IX compares the main characteristics and results
of the solutions focused on fault and malfunction detection.
Finally, Fig. 5 shows the distribution of the analyzed solutions
regarding their application scenario and behavior source, and
their publication year.
V. PUBLIC DATASETS
To address Q4 (Which behavior datasets are available and
which are their characteristics?), this section reviews the
main public datasets containing device behavior activities and
characteristics found in the literature. Each dataset is described
by taking into account the devices and sources monitored, and
data morphology. Below, the analysis is organized according to
the two main application scenarios stated in Section II, which
are Device identification and Misbehavior detection –attack
and anomaly detection.
A. Device Identification Datasets
Several datasets published in recent years and collecting
device behavior are conceived to perform device model, type, or
individual identification. In 2006, Maya Rodrig et al. published
the uw/sigcomm2004 dataset [128]. The main purpose of this
dataset is to analyze how Wi-Fi networks work and how they
can be improved. This dataset contains 70 GB of both wired
and wireless traces. The wireless traces were collected for
five days using three computers in monitor mode near access
points. Selcuk Uluagac published in [129] the dataset associated
with his research work on network-based individual device
identification [65], [130]. This dataset contains the inter-arrival
time of network traffic packets collected from 30 wireless
devices. 1.5 GB of data was collected both actively, directly
communicating with the devices, and passively, sniffing the
communications. This dataset can be used to generate network-
based fingerprints and derive parameters such as approximated
clock skew.
With a similar goal, but focused on IoT, Miettinen et al.
published the IoT Sentinel dataset [12]. This dataset contains
the traffic generated during the setup of 31 IoT devices of 27
different types (4 types have 2 devices). To avoid anomalies and
have data variety, the device setup process was collected at least
20 times for each device, generating a total of 64 MB of data.
Another dataset dealing with IoT devices is the Yourthings
dataset [127], which contains raw network traffic from 45
different smart-home IoT devices. The data was collected for
10 days in March and April of 2018. Each day data contains
from 10 to 13 GB. In [127], the authors utilized the collected
network flows to characterize each device model and evaluate
its security properties. Following the same environment, in [4],
Sivanathan et al. published a dataset collected for IoT device
classification under IoT Traffic Traces name. The data was
collected in 2016 for 20 days from 28 different IoT devices,
including cameras, lights, plugs, sensors, appliances, and health-
monitors. In addition, this dataset also includes captures from
non-IoT devices such as laptops and smartphones. In total,
≈9.5 GB of raw pcap files are available. As additional content,
post-processing tools to obtain IP, NTP, and DNS flows are
also enclosed. More recently, Hagelskjr et al. published in
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Work Year Device Type Approach Algorithms BehaviorSource Features Dataset Anomaly Results
[75] 2018 IoT Devices AnomalyDetection Vector distance Network
Sensor values
statistics
[148],
[149]
Faulty IoT
sensors
94.9% and 92.5% average precision and
recall, respectively. 3 mins for detection.
[52] 2019 IoT Devices Classification
PCA, DBSCAN,
Euclidean
distance
Network Statisticalfeatures Private
Physical and
mechanical
errors
Successful threat detection regarding
physical damage and mechanical
exhaustion.
[8] 2017 ICSs AnomalyDetection
Expectation
Maximization Sensors
Sensor values
statistics Private System Faults 89.5% AUC detection train door failures.
[87] 2019 NFV systems AnomalyDetection LSTM System logs
Microservice
execution
traces statistics
Private Serviceanomalies
>90% accuracy using real-word cloud
traces.
[88] 2019 Generalcomputers
Statistical
Analysis
PANAL
(pulse-oriented
time series)
System logs Performancemetrics Private
Anomalous
system
behavior
Exploratory study on metric correlations
regarding performance, event, and
process logs.
[83] 2016 NFV systems AnomalyDetection
Clustering and
Classification
(Not Specified)
Resource
usage
CPU, memory,
disk, network
(Linux /proc)
Private NFVanomalies
95% recognition of pre-defined
anomalous scenarios.
[96] 2017 Clustersystems
Anomaly
Detection PCA
Resource
usage
CPU, memory,
disk, network
From
Lonestar4
Cluster
anomalies Anomalies correctly detected.
[94] 2017 Cloudsystems
Anomaly
Detection Robust PCA
Resource
usage
CPU,
memory, disk Private Cloud faults 88.54% accuracy and 86% F1-Score
[47] 2018 NFV systems AnomalyDetection Online ARIMA
Resource
usage
CPU, memory,
disk, network Private
NFV Resource
anomalies
100% accuracy detecting controlled
HDD, CPU and memory anomalies.
[34] 2018 Cloudsystems
Anomaly
Detection
PCA,
eigenvector
Resource
usage
CPU, memory,
disk, network Private Cloud faults The system detects injected test faults.
[95] 2018 NFV systems AnomalyDetection BIRCH
Resource
usage
CPU, memory,
disk, network Private
System
anomalies
Almost all anomalies perfectly detected,
except 83% detection for memory leak
and CPU stress.
[97] 2018 MicroservicesContainers Classification
SVM, RF,
k-NN, NB
Resource
usage
CPU, memory,
network Private
Container
anomalies
97-93% F1-Score using k-NN as
classifier.
[16] 2020 Containerclusters
Anomaly
Detection HHMM
Resource
usage CPU, memory Private
Resource
exhaustion 95-90% F1-Score and 19-31% FAR.
TABLE IX: Main malfunction and fault detection solutions that use device behavior fingerprinting (works are grouped by
behavior source, using double horizontal lines to separate them, and sorted by year).
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Fig. 5: Distribution graphs of device behavior fingerprinting solutions.
2020 a dataset designed for IoT device identification based
on radio spectrum monitoring [150]. The dataset contains +50
GB of 863-870 MHz band raw spectrum measurements with a
sampling frequency of 10 MSPS collected in November 2018.
The published dataset contains both raw spectrum captures and
pre-processed features extracted with PCA. The raw data from
different device locations are available, such as in the same
room, in different rooms, or upstairs.
TABLE X summarizes the public datasets previously de-
scribed, paying attention in their publication year, monitored
devices, and data sources collected. Most of the datasets (5
of 6) contain network traces or network-based features. It
could be due to the facility to monitor from outside the device
behavior without modifying its software. Furthermore, this
source is quite generic as almost every device has at least
one network interface. Additionally, the only dataset not based
in network communications contains spectrum measurements,
another externally-collected source. In this context, there is
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Dataset Year Device Type Data Source Data Size Details
The uw/sigcomm2004
dataset [128] 2006
Wireless and
wired devices Network Raw traces 70 GB
This dataset includes the traces collected by wireless and wired
monitoring using tcpdump.
The gatech/fingerprinting
dataset [129] 2014 Wireless devices Network
Inter-arrival
time information 1.5 GB
Inter-arrival time information collected from 30 wireless
devices to generate unique fingerprints.
IoT Sentinel [12] 2017 IoT devices Network Raw traces andprocessed features 64 MB
Network communications dataset collected during the setup
process of 31 devices.
Yourthings [127] 2018 IoT devices Network Raw traces andprocessed features +110 GB
10 days of network traffic collected from 45 different smart-
home IoT devices. Flows utilized to evaluate security.
IoT Trace Dataset [4] 2018 IoT devices Network Raw traces andprocessed features ≈9.5 GB
Network flows collected during 20 days from 28 different IoT
Devices. The source includes tools to derive flow statistics.
Device spectrum
identification [150] 2020 IoT devices
Radio
Spectrum
Raw spectrum and
processed features +50 GB
863-870 MHz radio spectrum measurements collected in
diverse scenarios, like in the same room and different rooms.
TABLE X: Most relevant device identification datasets that use device behavior fingerprinting.
a missing spot for device identification datasets containing
sources such as clock skew, system logs or events, and resource
usage metrics.
B. Anomalous Behavior and Attack Datasets
The second dataset category is based on public datasets
containing anomalous device behavior, either based on attacks
or other exceptional situations. Note that most of these datasets
also contain normal or benign device behavior, which can be
utilized to model normal device behavior and identify it, like
in the previous subsection. Next, the main datasets found in
the literature will be detailed.
The family of datasets that considers network communica-
tions to create device behavior fingerprints is extensive. One
of the most representative is the CTU-13 dataset [142], a
botnet traffic activity dataset collected in 2011. 13 different
botnet samples were captured during different attack conditions
such as Command and Control (C&C) connection and the
launching of diverse attacks –DDoS, or port scanning, among
others. Additionally, the dataset also contains normal and
background network traffic. In total, this dataset contains +140
hours of network traffic with a total size of ≈700 GB. A
set of relevant datasets, IDS 2017 and 2018 datasets [136],
was created by the Canadian Institute of Cybersecurity (CIC).
They contain raw network traces and derived features obtained
during different network attacks. Concretely, the monitored
attacks were FTP and SSH Brute Force, DoS, Heartbleed,
Web Attacks, Infiltration, Botnet, and DDoS. In addition, these
datasets also contain benign traffic. The 2017 dataset was
collected from 25 users and contains 51.1 GB of data, while
the 2018 dataset contains 220 GB of traffic from 500 different
devices. The previous datasets were collected and processed by
Lima et al. [64] to extract ≈40 MB of vectors with 73 features
relative to IP headers of the traffic flows. Then, the dataset
was published together with a research article. Also from CIC,
the ISCX botnet dataset [132] contains raw network captures
of 16 different botnet malware. This dataset is generated by
combining previous CIC datasets containing botnet activity. In
total, the dataset contains 5.3 GB of training traces and 8.5
GB for testing. Aligned with the previous datasets, in [151],
the authors provided a novel network dataset, published in
September 2019, which contains several types of attacks in
an IoT environment. The dataset is composed of ≈ 1.5 GB
of real and simulated attacks, such as port scanning, flooding,
brute force, or ARP spoofing, among others. In the case of
real attacks, the network packets were obtained from Mirai
botnet. To identify the network behavior of the devices infected,
packets were captured while simulating attacks through tools
such as NMAP.
Anomalous behavior or attacks affecting IoT devices is
another cutting edge field where several datasets have been
created and published. In this sense, the N-BaIoT dataset [141]
contains more than 7 million vectors, with 115 features each,
giving around 20 GB, obtained by processing the network
communications of 9 different IoT commercial devices under
attack. Vectors contain 11 labels, 10 for different botnet attacks,
produced by Mirai and BASHLITE, and 1 for benign traffic.
Similarly, the DS2OS dataset [139] contains 61 MB of features
obtained from application layer traces collected from simulated
IoT devices such as light controllers, thermometers, movement
sensors, washing machines, batteries, thermostats, smart doors,
and smartphones. This dataset is designed for anomaly detection
in IoT node communications. In the same line, the USNW
IoT Benign and Attack Traces Dataset [10] monitored network
communications of 27 devices for 30 days, being 10 of these
devices victims of network attacks such as ARP spoofing,
TCP/UDP flooding, and packet reflection. In total, more than
64 GB of data is available. This dataset also provides the source
code to derive vectors with 238 features using packet counters
and traffic flows. Another relevant dataset is the NGIDS-DS
dataset [89], which consists of 6.7 GB of labeled network and
device operating system logs collected on a simulated critical
infrastructure. The dataset is designed for host-based intrusion
detection and contains normal and attack scenarios. The authors
used the IXIA Perfect Storm tool to generate a wide variety
of network attacks. The data was obtained from a machine
running Ubuntu 14.04 and different common services such
as Apache. The OS logs contain the date, process id, system
call, event id, and the network data consist of raw traffic. A
similar approach was followed to generate the UNSW-NB15
dataset [135]. This dataset contains 100 GB of raw traffic flows
and derived features from several attacks launched using IXIA
Perfect Storm. This attack set includes the same type of attacks
as NGIDS-DS dataset. The Aposemat IoT-23 dataset [152],
published in January 2020 by the same team as for CTU-
13 [142], is another labeled dataset containing 23 captures
of malicious and benign IoT network traffic. Concretely, 20
captures include malware activity, while 3 include normal
network activity of 3 IoT device types. The dataset includes
11.3 GB of pcap files and 8.7 GB of network log files. The
authors utilized known malware, such as Mirai, Okiru, or Torii
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botnets, port scanning, DDoS, C&C connections.
Focused on application layer communications of general
computers, ECML-PKDD 2007 [153] and HTTP CSIC 2010
[154] datasets are available. ECML-PKDD 2007 [153] contains
80 MB of application layer requests in XML format. There
are 25000 valid and 15000 attack requests, the attack requests
include SQL Injection, LDAP Injection, cross-site scripting
(XSS), and command execution, among others. The data
includes web requests and also context information such as
server operating system, services, etc. Also dealing with the
communication application layer, the HTTP CSIC 2010 dataset
[154] includes 56 MB of normal and abnormal HTTP requests.
It was published by the Spanish Research National Council
(CSIC) to test web application attack protection systems. The
dataset is divided into 36000 normal and 25000 anomalous
requests. The anomalous requests are divided into three types
of attacks: static, dynamic, and unintentional illegal requests.
Concretely, static attacks try to gather hidden resources, while
dynamic attacks are SQL injections, XSS, etc. This dataset is
usually used as benchmark for HTTP layer anomalous behavior
detection solutions.
From the system calls and execution traces perspective, it is
worth commenting the ADFA Intrusion Detection Datasets for
Linux [84] and Windows [155]. These datasets contain 9 MB of
Linux system call identifiers and 13.6 GB of Windows XML
system call traces of DLL libraries. Both datasets include
normal and attack system calls. Attacks include HydraFTP,
HydraSSH, Meterpreter, Webshell, and a poisoned executable.
Currently, these are widely used for benchmarking solutions
based on system call traces [156], [157]. The Firefox-SD
dataset [158] is also based on system calls, but in this case made
by Firefox browser in Linux. The dataset contains +1 TB of
normal activity traces, collected while executing seven browser
testing frameworks, and attack-based traces, generated under
attacks using known exploits such as memory consumption,
integer overflow, or null pointer exploit.
Dealing with ICSs and anomaly detection, one of the
reference datasets is the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT)
dataset [143]. This dataset was collected in 2016 from a real
water treatment testbed managed by a SCADA system. It
contains 11 days of continuous operation, 7 of them normal
and 4 under attack by 36 different data injections. This dataset
contains ≈16 GB of traffic logs and 361 MB of measurements
obtained from 51 sensors and actuators deployed in the scenario.
Additionally, SWaT dataset was updated in December 2019
with 45 GB of raw traffic and 6 MB of measurement logs,
collected during 3 hours of normal traffic and 1 hour in which
6 attacks were launched. Similarly, the Water Distribution
(WADI) dataset [144] contains 575 MB of labeled sensor
and actuator logs collected in the same water treatment plant.
In this case, the dataset contains data from 123 sensors and
actuators collected during 16 days of operation, having 14
days of normal traffic and 2 days with 15 data injection attacks
launched in total. Also in the ICS field, in [120], Perales
et al. developed a dataset called Electra, based on a railway
electric traction substation. The monitored network protocols
were Modbus TCP and S7Comm, common in SCADA systems.
This dataset contains 1.7 GB of derived features originating
from raw captures. Besides, the authors perform classification
and anomaly detection (RF, SVM, DNN, OC-SVM, IF) using
the published data, achieving 99-93% F1-Score. In this same
work, the authors also perform a comparison between attack
datasets focused on traditional networks [136], [142], [133],
[134] and in ICSs [143], [144].
Regarding resource usage monitoring, the GWA-T-12 Bit-
brains dataset [145] contains performance metrics collected
from 1750 virtual machines located in Bitbrains data center.
Resource usage metrics are collected in five-minute samples,
the monitored resources are the CPU usage, memory usage,
disk read/write throughput, and network received/transmitted
throughput. In total, 2.7 GB of traces are available, divided into
two sets of machines (1250 VMs used for fast storage and 500
with lower performance). Although BEHACOM [159] dataset
is focused on user activity monitoring (keyboard and mouse
interactions), it also contains resource usage metrics regarding
active applications, CPU, and memory. This data was collected
from the computers of 12 users over 55 days. In total, this
dataset contains 6.1 GB of features derived from user activity.
Also dealing with resource usage monitoring but from the
mobile devices prism, CIC has released two different datasets
on dynamic smartphone behavior and its relationship with
malware. The first one is CIC-AAGM (CIC Android Adware
and General Malware) [160], which contains +20 GB of traffic
flows generated when installing 1900 different applications,
being 250 adware, 150 malware, and 1500 benign. The second
is InvesAndMal2019 [161] dataset, which includes device
status, traffic flows, permissions, API calls, and logs generated
by 426 malware and 5065 benign Android applications. In
total +275 MB of logs and features are available.
At this point is important to mention that other existing
datasets are more than 20 years old, which makes them outdated
with regard to current scenarios. This is the case of DARPA
1998/1999 [162], [163], KDD99 [133], and NSL-KDD [134]
datasets. The original datasets, DARPA 1998 and 1999, are
composed of ≈ 10 GB of network traffic and system logs
collected by MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The aim of these datasets
was to build a generic evaluation dataset for intrusion detection.
56 different attacks were recorded, including different DoS,
buffer overflow, and reconnaissance attacks, among others. The
network traces were stored in tcpdump format and the system
logs as BSM/NT audit data. Afterward, KDD99 dataset was
derived from DARPA traffic by extracting 1.2 GB of features
from the traffic flows. Besides, NSL-KDD is a refinement of
KDD99 were duplicated entries are deleted and classes are
more balanced, reducing the dataset to around 60 MB. These
datasets have become some of the most popular datasets for
intrusion detection evaluation. However, as commented before,
they are outdated compared to current networks and attacks.
The same issue occurs with the system call dataset of the
University of New Mexico (UNM) [164]. This dataset was
collected in 1999 and contains ≈500 kB of system call and
process identifiers. The collected system calls contain normal
activity and different attacks such as buffer overflows and
trojans. This dataset has been widely used as benchmark
for system call anomalies-based attack detectors [98], [165].
However, the system call arguments are not available and it is
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Dataset Year Device Type Data Source Data Size Details
DARPA [162], [163] 1998-1999
General
computers
Network and
system logs
Raw network packets
and logs (bsm) ≈ 10 GB
Attack and normal network and system activity. One of
the most used IDS datasets, but it is outdated.
KDD99 [133] 1999 Generalcomputers Network
Connection
record features 1.2 GB
Derived features based on DARPA 1998/1999 network
traffic.
UNM dataset [164] 1999 Generalcomputers System calls
System calls
and process IDs
≈500
KB
System call identifiers collected during normal behavior
and under some attacks.
ECML-PKDD
2007 [153] 2007 Web systems Network
Requests and
contextual information 80 MB
25000 valid and 15000 attack XML web queries,
including context information such as server OS.
NSL-KDD [134] 2009 Generalcomputers Network
Connection
record features 60 MB
Based on KDD99 data, but with additional processing like
filtering duplicated data.
HTTP CSIC 2010 [154] 2010 Web systems Network HTTP requests 56 MB
36000 normal and 25000 anomalous HTTP requests.
Anomalous requests include diverse attacks and also
unintentional illegal requests.
CTU-13 [142] 2011 Generalcomputers Network
Raw captures
and flows
≈700
GB
13 different scenarios were botnet activity is combined
with normal traffic.
Firefox-SD [158] 2013 Application(Firefox) System calls Raw system calls +1 TB
Firefox browser system calls while normal activity and
under different attacks.
ADFA-LD [84] 2013 Generalcomputers System calls Linux system logs 9 MB System calls collected on 60 different attack sets
ADFA-WD [155] 2014 Generalcomputers System calls
XML Windows
DLL traces 13.6 GB
System call dataset composed by virtual kernel calls done
by DLL libraries.
CIC-ISCX [132] 2014 Generalcomputers Network Raw captures 13.8 GB
Botnet activity dataset collected from 16 real botnet
malware.
GWA-T-12
Bitbrains [145] 2015
Distributed data
centers (Cloud) Resource usage
CPU, Memory, Disk
and Network statistics 2.7 GB
Performance metrics (CPU, memory, disk and network)
collected from 1750 VMs each 5 mins.
SWaT [143] 2016 ICSs Network, andsensors/actuators
Network and
sensor/actuator logs
≈16.3
GB
7 days of normal activity and 4 days of data injection
attacks in a real water treatment testbed.
WADI [144] 2016 ICSs Sensors /actuators Sensor/actuator logs 575 MB
16 days of logs of 123 industrial sensors and actuators. 15
attacks launched over 2 days.
NGIDS-DS [89] 2017 Criticalinfrastructure
Network and
system logs
Raw network packets
and audit logs 6.7 GB
Critical infrastructure attacks simulated on an Ubuntu
14.04 machine using IXIA PerfectStorm tool.
UNSW-NB15 [135] 2017 Generalcomputers Network
Raw captures and
processed features 100 GB
IDS dataset, attacks generated using IXIA PerfectStorm
tool.
CIC-IDS 2017[136] 2017 Generalcomputers Network
Raw captures and
processed features 51.1 GB
IDS dataset based on 25 users activity, it contains
common network attacks.
CIC-AAGM [160] 2017 Mobile devices Network Raw captures andprocessed features +20 GB
Flows generated by 1900 different applications (250
adware, 150 malware, 1500 benign).
DS2OS [139] 2018 IoT devices Network Applicationlayer traces 61 MB IoT smart home devices normal and abnormal activity.
N-BaIoT [141] 2018 IoT devices Network Processed features ≈20 GB Botnet (Mirai and BASHLITE) activity collected from 9IoT devices.
CIC-IDS 2018 [136] 2018 Generalcomputers Network
Raw captures and
processed features 220 GB
IDS dataset collected in 500 devices which contain
common network attacks.
Smart-Detection [64] 2019 Generalcomputers Network Processed features ≈40 MB
DoS detection based on previous datasets (CIC-DoS, CIC-
IDS 2017 and CIC-IDS 2018).
ELECTRA [120] 2019 ICSs Network Modbus/ S7Commprecomputed features 1.7 GB Data collected from attacks to an electric traction system.
USNW IoT Benign
and Attack Traces [10] 2019 IoT devices Network
Raw captures and
processed features +64 GB
IoT benign and attack network traces. Attacks include
ARP spoofing, TCP/UDP flooding and packet reflection.
IoT network intrusion
dataset [151] 2019 IoT devices Network Raw captures ≈1.5 GB
Network captures of real and simulated attacks to IoT and
non-IoT devices.
InvesAndMal2019 [161] 2019 Mobile devices System logsand Network
Processed logs
and features +275 MB
Device status, traffic flows, API calls and logs generated
from +5500 apps (426 malware and 5065 benign).
BEHACOM [159] 2020 Generalcomputers Resource usage
CPU and
memory statistics 6.1 GB
Active application, CPU and memory statistics collected
from 12 users over 55 days.
IoT-23 [152] 2020 IoT devices Network Raw captures 20 GB By the same team that CTU-13. 20 attack and 3 benigntraces. Attacks simulated using infected Raspberry Pis.
TABLE XI: Most relevant anomalous behavior and attack datasets that use device behavior fingerprinting.
outdated regarding modern attacks.
TABLE XI gives an overview of the public datasets with
focus on behavior anomaly and attack detection. It can be
appreciated how most of the datasets are focused on network,
followed by system calls and logs. The datasets monitoring the
previous sources are varied and cover several device types such
as IoT, ICSs, mobile devices, or general computers. However,
other sources such as resource usage or HPCs are under-
exploited regarding public datasets for anomaly detection.
Fig. 6 shows the dataset distribution regarding main ap-
plication scenarios and behavior source collected, and their
publication year. Note that some datasets can contain several
sources at the same time, for example, network communications
and system logs. As final section thoughts, we notice that when
it comes to developing a behavior evaluation solution, a key
aspect is data availability, as the underlying solutions depend on
it. Many works utilize self-collected private datasets to validate
their approaches. However, to have a proper performance
comparison, it is worth having public datasets allowing to
cross-verify the proposed solutions. Furthermore, some teams
do not have enough resources to collect enough data but
have good processing and evaluation ideas. Therefore, having
public datasets is essential to make diverse and well-performing
behavior-based proposals possible.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED, TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
This section is in charge of responding Q5 (How have
application scenarios evolved for the last years?). To this
end, it summarizes the main lessons learned, trends, and
conclusions extracted from the present study of device behavior
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(a) Scenario and source dataset distribution. (Internal ring: Application
scenario. External ring: Behavior Source.)
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(b) Yearly dataset distribution.
Fig. 6: Distribution graphs of device behavior fingerprinting dataset.
fingerprinting. In addition, it presents some research challenges
in the behavioral fingerprinting field.
A. Lessons Learned
After reviewing and analyzing the state-of-the-art, we were
able to identify the following main lessons:
• Network communications are the most exploited
source. As Fig. 5 shows, it is utilized in 100% of works
focused on device models or type identification, and in
56.25% of attack detection solutions. However, this source
is less exploited in individual device identification (9.09%
of the solutions) and malfunction detection (15.38%).
This is because the data obtained from the network
communication perspective is not sensitive enough as
required for these scenarios, e.g., two devices of the same
model deployed with the same purpose will have almost
identical network communications.
• Clustering is widely applied for inferring classes. As
TABLE VI shows, in device type or model identification
solutions, many solutions combine unlabeled data with
clustering to group data samples and derive device classes,
and then apply ML/DL classification approaches. Besides,
some attack and malfunction detection techniques also
rely on this approach (see TABLE VIII and TABLE IX).
This fact shows the viability of clustering techniques for
deriving classes from unlabeled behavioral data.
• Individual identification is one of the most complex
application scenarios. Only some lower-level features,
such as system clocks, code execution time, clock skew,
or electromagnetic signals are sensitive enough to detect
minimum physical differences that occurred during the
device manufacturing processes. Thus, these are the
ones required for individual identification. However, the
monitoring of these sources is usually complex.
• There is no consensus in misbehavior detection so-
lutions. Attack and malfunction detection is addressed
from many heterogeneous perspectives. The selection of
source and processing techniques depends on the type
of anomalies that will be detected. Although network is
the most used source, many solutions take benefit from
system calls and logs, hardware events, or resource usage.
• Public datasets are mainly focused on network, system
calls, and logs. Fig. 6 shows that there are 32 elements
containing these sources (note that some datasets contain
both sources at the same time, so they are counted both
as network and calls / logs source). Moreover, TABLE X
and XI show that in most occasions the datasets contain
raw data instead of processed information or features.
B. Current Trends
The main approaches and ideas expected in future works,
based on the evolution of the proposals published in recent
years, are:
• ML and DL algorithms prominence. As Fig. 4 shows,
ML and DL are the most usual techniques, with a
45.88% of importance (note that many solutions utilize
different techniques). In addition, DL-based techniques
are gaining more importance, especially for time series
processing, due to their performance handling raw data
without pre-calculated features. Besides, in TABLE VI,
VII, VIII, and IX, it can be appreciated that in both
behavior fingerprinting scenarios considered, identification
and misbehavior detection, ML and DL approaches are
the most common processing and evaluation techniques.
ML and DL algorithms are applied in the 69.56% of
identification and in the 64.44% of misbehavior detection
solutions.
• Statistical and knowledge-based algorithms relegation.
As Fig. 4 shows, processing and evaluation based on
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statistical and knowledge-based algorithms are losing
importance as evaluation approaches, in favor of ML and
DL.
• Dataset publication. As it can be appreciated in Fig. 6
and in TABLE X and TABLE XI, a good number of
datasets have been published for the last years. In the last
five years (2016-2020), 20 public datasets were released,
while in the previous five years (2011-2015) were only 7.
• Attack detection is gaining importance. Fig. 5 shows
how attack detection solutions have been gaining promi-
nence in the last years, increasing from a 33.3% in 2017
to a 71.4% in 2020. In contrast, the focus on type or
model identification and fault detection has decreased for
the last years.
C. Future Challenges
Based on the current state-of-the-art, the following points
represent the main challenges that future behavior fingerprinting
solutions might consider to enhance current solutions.
• Usage of public datasets for behavior-based solution
performance comparison. Many solutions are based
on private datasets, which makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to compare performance between different
solutions. Among the solutions analyzed, only 41.66%
regarding device model/type identification used public
datasets. The same goes for the 18.18% about individual
device identification, 43.75% tackling attacks, and 7.69%
concerning malfunction detection, by using public datasets.
Thus, a right direction for future approaches is to evaluate
and compare their performance through public datasets.
• Diverse and quality behavior dataset publication. Re-
garding device identification, the main publicly available
datasets are focused on the network communications
source. However, there is a lack of modern and variate
datasets based on other sources. Then, to build a compre-
hensive enough dataset background, it would be interesting
for novel proposals addressing behavioral fingerprinting
to publish the collected datasets, if any. Besides, datasets
should have enough quality to ensure that research results
are not influenced or damaged by low-quality data.
• Solution scalability regarding the number of moni-
tored devices and deployment architecture. Scalability
is an issue that affects various aspects of behavior
monitoring solutions. Many solutions covering individual
device identification have noticed the number of devices
to be identified as an issue [56], [65], [58], as with the
increase of devices, the classification results got worse.
Furthermore, centralized deployments may suffer if too
many devices send behavioral data, or blockchain-based
solutions may suffer block validation issues. Finally,
during data evaluation, solutions based on statistical
approaches that require one to one evaluation [82] may
not scale at all when the number of devices increases.
• Define anomaly countermeasures to apply when an
attack or fault is detected. Many solutions solve the
misbehavior detection problem, both when caused by a
cyberattack or a system fault. However, most solutions
do not propose any countermeasure [166] to mitigate the
detected misbehavior. Only a few works propose some
remedies for misbehavior, such as [7], [80].
• Secure the behavior monitoring and analysis process
against attacks. The fingerprinting solutions can suffer
attacks or modifications performed by malicious entities.
This fact can jeopardize the entire fingerprinting mecha-
nism, and in the case of centralized processing solutions,
even affect other device behavior evaluation. However, few
works [78] took behavior monitoring security into account.
To solve this issue, additional security mechanisms, such
as encryption, should be added to current solutions. Also,
trust frameworks [167] can be included in behavior
monitoring deployments to guarantee system safety.
• Guarantee behavioral data privacy. As in user behavior
[168], privacy is a crucial aspect to consider when perform-
ing data analysis. From an ethical perspective, behavior
analysis solutions should be employed to fingerprint
devices in a non-intrusive way. However, privacy laws,
such as GDPR [169] in Europe, are mainly focused on user
perspective, leaving some device behavior fingerprinting
methods out of their scope. To solve this problem, privacy-
preserving solutions, such as federated learning [101]
combined with differential privacy [170], allow training
models to ensure data privacy.
• Apply novel ML/DL approaches for behavior process-
ing and evaluation. As ML and DL are fast-evolving
fields, some recent techniques have not been applied yet.
For example, UMAP [171] for dimensionality reduction,
or XGBoost [172] for classification, could improve current
solution performance. Besides, DL architectures may
combine convolutional and recurrent neuron layers for
DL-based time series processing [173], [174]. Finally, any
of the analyzed solutions addressed an approach based on
Reinforcement learning [175], which has gained notable
relevance in communications and networking areas [176],
and human behavior analysis [177].
• Consider ML/DL models behavior in the device anal-
ysis. Nowadays, devices usually include embedded ML
and DL models that perform specific tasks with the
data the device manipulates. However, the ML and DL
models deployed on the devices have their own behavior
[178], which influences the general device behavior. Then,
understanding AI-powered applications and services is
critical to identify the device behavior and its anomalies.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Device behavior fingerprinting has been determined in recent
years as a promising solution to identify devices with different
granularity levels, as well as to detect misbehavior originated by
cyberattacks or faulty components. The article at hand studies
the evolution of the device behavior research field, performing
a comprehensive review of the devices, behavioral sources,
datasets, and techniques used in both application scenarios. In
this context, the present work has been performed with the
goal of answering the following research questions.
Q1. Which scenarios, device types, and sources are present
in behavior-based solutions? Section II reviews how these
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three aspects are used in the most recent and representative
works of the literature. The performed analysis shows a
relevant heterogeneity of device types and behavioral sources
in the existing solutions, and highlights the usage of network
communications in the majority of the solutions.
Q2. What and how behavior processing and evaluation tasks
are used in each scenario? Section III analyzes the main
techniques and algorithms –rule-based, statistical, knowledge-
based, ML and DL, and time-series approaches– used by works
dealing with device and misbehavior identification. The analysis
results show how ML and DL-based approaches are gaining
importanc due to their versatility and excellent performance
when enough training data is available, and to the detriment
of statistical and knowledge-based solutions.
Q3. What characteristics do the most recent and repre-
sentative solutions of each application scenario have? In
the core section of this article, Section IV, the reviewed
solutions are described, analyzed, and compared according
to their application scenario, device types, sources, techniques,
and results. Regarding sources, this section shows that in
device type or model identification solutions, network source
is the dominant approach. In individual device identification,
clock skew and electromagnetic signals are the main data
sources. Attack detection is also mainly tackled using network
communications. In contrast, for fault detection, the main
approach is to utilize resource usage data. In terms of processing
and evaluation techniques, ML and DL techniques are dominant
in all the considered scenarios.
Q4. Which behavior datasets are available and which are
their characteristics? In Section V, the main public datasets
containing device behavioral data are analyzed according to
their application scenario. It also details the characteristics of
the data they contain and how they were collected. This section
shows the prominence of network source in the current public
datasets, and the lack of other sources such as resource usage
or hardware events.
Q5. How have application scenarios evolved for the last
years? Lessons learned, current trends, and future challenges
have been drawn in Section VI, which details how network
source and ML/DL algorithms are gaining prominence. Fur-
thermore, it is also remarkable that novel ML/DL approaches,
such as recurrent and convolutional neuron layer combination
or Reinforcement learning, have not yet been applied in the
area, which opens up pathways for future research. It also
depicts how dataset publication is gaining importance during
the last years; however, more relevant datasets are still required
for sources and devices that are not covered in recent ones,
e.g., resource usage or system logs in IoT devices or ICSs.
Aligned with the current trend and challenges drawn in
this work, we will focus our next efforts on designing and
implementing scalable behavior-based solutions to identify
individual devices and detect cyberattacks affecting IoT devices.
In both scenarios, we plan to utilize privacy-preserving ML
and DL techniques, such as distributed and federated learning,
to protect behavioral data while guaranteeing performance
capabilities. Finally, we plan to build datasets for both scenarios,
which will be publicly accessible to improve current dataset
diversity and quality.
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